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International Affairs: NATO, WEU Suspend Adriatic Embargo

AU1906155096 Paris AFP in English
1535 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Naples, Italy, June 19 (AFP)—NATO and the Western European Union, the EU's defence arm, on Wednesday [19 June] suspended their joint operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic enforcing the UN arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia.

"NATO and WEU ships will no longer challenge, board or divert ships in the Adriatic," a statement issued by the Atlantic alliance's southern Europe headquarters said.

But the alliance warned that the operation could be rapidly cranked up again if the situation deteriorated.

"NATO and WEU forces will be prepared to resume enforcement operations if economic sanctions are reimposed in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1022," the statement said.

The UN embargo on the sale of arms to former Yugoslavia which came into force on September 25, 1991, was finally lifted on Tuesday.

"Since the beginning of the enforcement operation, 73,000 ships have been challenged by NATO and WEU forces, more than 5,800 have been inspected at sea and almost 1,400 have been diverted and inspected in port," the statement said. "We consider this operation as a success, as no ships have been reported as having broken the embargo, although six were caught while attempting to do so."

International Affairs: B-H Election Decision Pending

AU2006102396 Paris AFP in English
1001 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vienna, June 20 (AFP)—The OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] will probably announce next Tuesday [25 June] whether elections in Bosnia should be held by mid-September as called for by the Dayton peace accords, OSCE chairman Flavio Cotti said Thursday.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is responsible for organizing and supervising the polls and must decide whether all the necessary conditions, including freedom of movement and media access, are in place before giving the go-ahead for the elections.

Cotti, the Swiss foreign minister, is the current head of the OSCE's rotating presidency.

Albania: CE Official Praises Justice Ministry

AU2006113196 Tirana ATA in English
1934 GMT 19 Jun 96

[Report by Atlant Frasheri]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 19 (ATA)—"Achievements of your ministry are very impressing," said Leni Fischer, chairwoman of the Council of Europe [CE] Assembly, in a letter to Albanian Justice Minister Hektor Frasheri.

According to ministry spokesman, Fischer said in her letter that her meetings with Minister Frasheri were fruitful and a contribution to the continuous cooperation between the Justice Ministry of Albania and the Council of Europe.

Albania: Berisha Decrees New Legislature To Convene 1 Jul

AU2006082096 Tirana ATA in English
1548 GMT 19 Jun 96

["Decree on the Summoning of First Session of New Legislature of People's Assembly"—ATA headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 19 (ATA)—On the basis of Article 17, Third Paragraph, and Article 28, Point 3, of the Law No 7,491, dated April, 29, 1991 "On Constitutional Provisions," I decree:

Article 1

The first session of the new legislature of the People's Assembly will convene on Monday, July 1, 1996.

Article 2

This decree comes into force immediately.

Tirana, June 19, 1996

Decree No 1,508
President of the Republic Sali Berisha

Albania: Socialists Tell AFP of Plan To Boycott Parliament

AU1906170896 Paris AFP in English
1656 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 19 (AFP)—Albania's main opposition Socialist Party will boycott the country's new parliament claiming it is illegitimate, the party vice president said here Wednesday [19 June].

"The Socialist Party does not recognise the results of the election and considers the new parliament to be illegitimate," Namik Dokle told AFP.

The Socialists won five seats in the 140-seat parliament prior to their dramatic withdrawal while the first round of a general election was in progress on May 26, citing widespread vote-rigging. The other main opposition parties followed suit, boycotting the second round along with the Socialists.

International monitors upheld the irregularity claims and the ballot was re-run last Sunday—amid another boycott—in 17 constituencies after international pressure on President Sali Berisha, whose Democratic Party won a landslide victory and will dominate the new legislature.

The parliament will hold its first session on July 2.

Albania: Daily: PS Seeks 'New Strategy' To Emerge From Crisis

AU2006075196 Tirana ATA in English
1346 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 19 (ATA)—The Socialist Party [PS] Presidency held a meeting Tuesday with its local leaders. The meeting, announced days ago, was the first after that of May 27, attended by all PS Leading Committee and deputies for the parliamentary elections, the newspaper DITA INFORMACION said.

According to the PS Deputy Secretary Sabit Brokaj, the aim of the six-hour meeting "was the acquaintance of the real situation in all Albanian districts." All 36 PS local secretaries reported one by one. "It seems that besides the diplomatic line, in the context of the parties which boycotted the May 26 elections, the biggest opposition party is looking for a new strategy to come out of the nationwide crisis and to face the new challenges in the interior plan," the paper says.

From well-informed sources during discussions the situation was said to be very difficult and in some places does exist a situation of depression which is reflected in the massive movement of people abroad.

Brokaj, immediately after the meeting declared that according to Tuesday's orientations of the PS highest leadership, "active massive democratic actions are the only way to oppose today's system," which he called "dictatorial."

The paper says it is still unknown what ways will the PS follow, because according to declarations, elaboration of ideas and tactics will continue and concrete decisions of another meeting are waited.

"In the mean time a deep silence is kept regarding some objections imprisoned PS leader Fatos Nano has made after the foreseen battle (as he calls it) of May 26," the paper says. It adds that these objections have been re-explained by Nano's wife in an interview some days ago.

The paper says that commenting on his objections she said "It is quite normal and necessary to seek to analyse yourself after such a situation."

None had officially declared until now that the PS will analyse itself, but it is not excluded and it may be realised very soon although they only speak of tactics and reorganisation in the conditions of the actual political system, the paper ends.

Bulgaria: Agreements With IMF, World Bank Postponed

AU2006112496 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 20 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Staff report: "Agreement With IMF, World Bank Postponed Until September"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a news conference in Sofia on 19 June, Alberto Musalem, World Bank representative in Bulgaria, said that the issue of the agreement with Bulgaria on the structural restructuring loan SAL-2 will most likely be submitted to the Board of Directors at the beginning of September. We are expecting the government to mark some progress in the structural restructuring measures, and then the World Bank will send a new delegation, he said. For the time being, the World Bank confirms its readiness to assist the social programs for the employees of the enterprises that will be eliminated, Mr. Musalem said. However, the maximum amount the cabinet can expect is $60-80 million. Informed sources claim that this amount will be transferred to Bulgaria in installments only after the actual closure of the specific enterprises.

According to Prime Minister Videnov, the cabinet has already fulfilled the commitments it assumed in the banking sector.

The commitments include the bankruptcies of five banks and sending appropriate memorandums to the other 19 banks that are in a state of capital inadequacy. However, people who attended the negotiations claim that the five banks for which the Bulgarian National Bank wanted to begin insolvency procedures have been determined by the Bulgarian Government. The international financial institutions have insisted on the bankruptcy of a specific number of banks in order to cut the losses in the real and banking sectors. It is doubtful whether the so-called structural elimination will mark any progress by the end of the month. The lobbies of the enterprises marked for elimination are very active among the members of the Democratic Left parliamentary faction and in the Bulgarian Socialist Party headquarters, and they could frustrate the prime minister's promises. According to well-informed sources, the IMF Board will review the agreement with Bulgaria on 12 July. The sources point out, however, that the World Bank opinion is decisive for the IMF. According to the World Bank representatives in Bulgaria, this opinion will be ready at the beginning of September at the earliest. This will be the most likely date for signing the agreements with the IMF and the World Bank. The best our country can expect is to receive the financial aid toward the end of September.

By the end of September, however, Bulgaria will have to pay $499.6 million toward its foreign debt ($61.6 million in June, and another $438 in the third quarter of the year). This, more or less, is all the money Bulgaria has, including its strategic gold reserves.

Bulgaria: Commentary Questions 'Gift' of Russian Arms

AU2006104296 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 20 Jun 96 p 3

[Commentary by Nedko Petrov: "After Grachev, Moscow's 'Free Lunch' Is Also Lost"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There are only a few days remaining before the first anniversary of the day on which Moscow announced its gift—100 T-72 tanks and 100 BMP-1P armored vehicles for the Ground Troops—which Sofia was supposed to receive about one year ago at no cost and free from any political conditions. It appears that there is a discrepancy between the wishes and possibilities of the politicians and the military. In the past 355 days, the Russian tanks "arrived" at least 20 times, and they are still "on the way" from the Ural to Varna. Two weeks ago, former Defense Minister Pavel Grachev even said that he would personally and symbolically bring to Bulgaria one T-72 tank and one BMP armored vehicle aboard a giant An-124 "Ruslan," so that the speculation about the Moscow gift would end. The minister fell—and there are no tanks.

Military experts and political scientists are forecasting that the dismissal of Army General Grachev (better known in Moscow as the "minister millionaire") from the post of defense minister will postpone the arrival of the tanks by at least six months—not because Moscow cannot send the equipment, which costs about $250 million, today or tomorrow, but because Russian politicians prefer to keep the tanks as a bargaining chip in bilateral relations with Sofia.

Each time there was another announcement that the tanks were coming, politicians from the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] coalition used to warn that there are no free lunches. It turned out that they were right. While our rulers were sitting at the table and waiting for the $250 million "free lunch," the Kremlin's head waiter kicked his defense minister out and transferred the account book to Gen. Lebed. It is well known that the former commander of the 14th Russian Army, which was also supposed to act on our territory on behalf of the Warsaw Pact, is not precisely in love with the Communists. Thus, when the person who holds Russia's future in his hands leafs through the pages of the account book and sees our account there—Russia: 100 tanks and 100 armored vehicles worth

$250 million to Bulgaria; Bulgaria: Zhan's [Videnov] obeisance—he will immediately file it away under "Forget It."

Bulgaria: Croatia Shows Interest in Fagot Antitank Missile

AU2006081996 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 20 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by Lyubomir Denov: "Zagreb Wants Our Antitank Missiles"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Croatian military has a special interest in the Bulgarian "Fagot" antitank missiles. This became clear after the talks that the delegation of the Bulgarian Defense Ministry conducted in Zagreb. Two variants have been discussed so far: production sharing or a direct supply. However, the Croatians insist on paying in kind.

Upon his return from Zagreb on 19 June, Bulgarian Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov confirmed that Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak will attend the Sofia military meeting in the autumn.

This was a leading item in the Croatian television newscasts. Observers recalled that their Foreign Minister Mate Granic refused to participate in the conference of the Balkan foreign ministers in Sofia. Croatian leaders are maintaining that Zagreb belongs to the Balkans only in the geographic sense of the word; while politically, culturally, and economically it views itself as a part of central Europe.

Bulgaria: Energy Minister, Unions Agree on Restructuring Mines

AU1906170996 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Energy Minister Rumen Ovcharov and representatives of the miners' trade unions today signed a protocol on an agreement that specifies measures for preserving the economically promising parts of the Balkanbas, Bistritsa, and Antratsit Mines; for liquidating other parts, taking into consideration the specific features of the sector; and for the social protection of the miners who will be unemployed.

Minister Ovcharov assumed a commitment to submit to the Council of Ministers a draft decree on removing the Cherno More [Black Sea] Mine from the list of mines for liquidation and on compensating the miners who will be unemployed by granting them from 12 to 24 monthly salaries.

The trade union assumed an obligation to refrain from organizing effective strike actions connected with the restructuring of the mining sector.

Czech Republic: Comment: Yeltsin's Russian Roulette With Lebed

AU1906143796 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 19 Jun 96 p 12

[Commentary by Jiri Doubrava: "Yeltsin's Russian Roulette With Lebed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yeltsin made a brilliant and, at the same time, risky move when, following his unconvincing victory in the first round of the presidential elections, he promptly removed Defense Minister Grachev and entrusted his "rival," the uncompromising General Lebed, with the most important functions in the state.

Grachev had to leave under circumstances that are particularly humiliating. His former subordinate and, at the same time, most dauntless critic, Gen. Lebed, however, is now far more valuable to Yeltsin.

Yeltsin maintains that the tandem with Lebed is a union not of two politicians but of two programs. The reality is more mundane: Lebed is for Yeltsin a perfect insurance policy for victory over the communist Zyuganov in the decisive duel of the second round. At the same time, however, this is a very risky wager for the future because Yeltsin has to expect from Lebed that, thanks to the authority granted to him, the general will begin sooner or later to compete with him for power.

As long as Lebed does not make a more serious mistake, he will soon outgrow Yeltsin and, in four years, maybe sooner, he could be the Russian president. Of course, there are almost too many possibilities for making a mistake in confronting the worldly wise and unprincipled Yeltsin.

Resolving the Chechen crisis will be the first acid test for Lebed. Until now, he has merely criticized General Grachev and Yeltsin for their course of action in Chechnya. Now he himself will have to find a solution.

It is said of Lebed that he is a man without compromises. In coexisting with Yeltsin, however, it will be hard to avoid them. If he is not to end up like Grachev soon, he will have to find the things that, compared with Yeltsin, he lacks—political deftness and the art of acquiring important allies.

Yeltsin—but, in the end, Lebed too—has staked too much too fast. Only the future will reveal whether Lebed was merely Yeltsin's instrument for hanging onto power or whether it was Yeltsin who opened the gate for Lebed to assume control of the world's biggest country.

Czech Republic: Daily Examines 'Fast' Yeltsin-Lebed Agreement

AU1906152096 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 19 Jun 96 p 1

[Commentary by Stanislav Drahny: "The General"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The agreement was unexpectedly fast. Aleksandr Lebed, a former general and, although he finished third, one of the factual winners of Sunday's [16 June] presidential elections, announced yesterday that he had come to an agreement with the current Russian president and accepted responsibility for the so-called power-wielding ministries. In return, his followers are to support Boris Yeltsin in the second round of the elections.

Yeltsin had previously declared that he had a protege among the countercandidates and recommended that he abstain from campaigning. Apparently, in return, the president would endorse him as his successor next time. There had been speculation that this chosen one would be the liberal and proreform Grigoriy Yavlinskiy. The speed with which Lebed, on whose 15 percent of supporters Communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov also had designs for the second round, decided in favor of the certainty of the already existing functions, however, wipes out this hypothesis.

Boris Yeltsin now hopes that he will manage to win with the help of the proreform Yavlinskiy voters and the votes of Lebed's supporters, which seems likely. The current Russian president's desire for power is undying and enables him to mobilize his forces at the right moment. Yeltsin, on whom just six months ago, when he was shuffling in a bloated fashion along the Kremlin's corridors, no one would have bet even a cent, and about whose state of health one horrifying myth was told after the other, is thus reminiscent of the heroes of Russian legends.

Thanks to this, Russia's reform course will evidently be maintained for another four years—of course, as long as Yeltsin's calculations do not overestimate Lebed's influence on the voters and, on the other hand, his own influence on the general, who may easily become the most powerful man in the country. So the fate of democracy in Russia will be decided chiefly by retired General Lebed, a man who a year ago told LIDOVE NOVINY that NATO's enlargement by the Czech Republic and Poland would lead to the third world war. Let us hope he did not mean it so absolutely seriously.

Czech Republic: Klaus Sums Up Atlantic Conference Paper

96CH0122A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 18 May 96 p 8

[Article by Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus: "An Opportunity for Cooperation, Not a Joint Crisis"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A week ago, an important international conference entitled "The New Atlantic Initiative" was held in Prague. It was organized by people who sensed the danger that paradoxically came into being as a result of the disappearance of one threatening danger of the past (or it has at least expressly diminished). Communism and the Soviet Union have disappeared and, thanks to that fact, a certain degree of carefreeness is spreading throughout the world. Introspection is beginning to dominate—both in Europe and also in the United States. Forgotten again is how fragile human society is, how easily vulnerable it is, how little is required to unleash a cumulative process that is then only halted with great difficulty.

There is no reason to fall prey to panic. In the speech that inaugurated the Saturday morning program entitled "Our Common Crisis," I rejected the word crisis. I see the present moment as a tremendously and incomparably hopeful opportunity for us all and not as a crisis. I recommended that we retain the word crisis for other occasions, when it will actually be needed. Moreover, I cannot imagine when in the past the world was experiencing an era of some kind of noncrisis, when there was that hypothetically golden time for humanity that we could consider to be the ideal point and against which we could measure all that followed.

I must measure reality according to another reality rather than according to an ideal. We are people made up of flesh and blood, complete with mistakes and sins. And we are not the only ones who are imperfect; the world in which we live is also imperfect. In no event, however, is this a question of crisis. On the contrary, I see clear progress and movement forward rather than backward, and I do not even see any disconcerted shuffling in place.

Unfortunately, there are those among us who see crisis the moment they do not have any central organ superimposed over them, an organ that would direct the world and their everyday lives. There are those among us who fear any kind of uncontrolled activity and spontaneity; there are those among us who want to control the world (and the rest of us) because they believe that they know best how the world should look. However, this must be fundamentally rejected.

But I must also reject the opposite extreme—a frivolous look at the world based on forgetting and underestimating various existing dangers. The tragic experiences of our parents and grandparents (even of a number of us here) involving fascism, communism, and the world war must not be forgotten. Transatlantic cooperation, which came into being after World War II out of these feelings, created NATO (and other international organizations). Today, however, there is a proliferation of questions asking what NATO is for if there is no more world communism.

It can be said that the Prague conference had to do precisely with this topic. In the past decades, we have subconsciously accepted the idea that NATO is an anticommunist bloc and nothing more. But neither I nor a number of other participants in the congress agreed with this. Transatlantic cooperation was not based on a single specific enemy. It had deeper roots and these are precisely what we must tie into today. It was based on commonly shared ideas on the defense of freedom, democracy, law, and the marketplace, rather than on adversaries. It involves the protection of the common European and U.S. civilizing and cultural heritage against external attack, but also against internal assaults, against assaults by firearms, but also against assaults that are far more insidious, such as the development and dissemination of nonliberal ideologies. It is our duty to protect our world for future generations. Twenty years ago, Bohumil Dolezal said in a dissident text that he fears the threat to our basic living values more than the threat to the environment (and I am citing from memory). I very much agree with this.

It is precisely here that I see many dangers at the present time and I must say that they do not only originate from distant ideologies that are so foreign to our culture, such as, for example, Islam. I see other seemingly innocent antiliberal ideas at home—proclaimed under such slogans as cooperativism, syndicalism, aggressive ecologism, and a new collectivism, based on the state sanctioning of the existence of various organizations' territorial interests. These attitudes can lead to renewed introspective closing off because they embody the most varied protectionist and exclusivistic slogans. Given their further and yet further dissemination, I could imagine some kind of a new "common crisis." Let us therefore not be seduced from the path and let us not be unnecessarily reckless. We need the United States here in Europe and the United States needs Europe just as much. This is what the Prague congress was all about. And it was good that it took place.

Czech Republic: ODS Likely To Have Majority in Cabinet

AU2006105796 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 19 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by Jiri Kubik and Sabina Slonkova: "Through Its Concessions, the ODS Has Created a Position for a Majority in the Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The two smaller coalition parties are slowly beginning to come to terms with the fact that, despite their bitter protests, the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] will most likely have a majority in the next cabinet.

Namely, during the five rounds of coalition talks, it has made concessions on fundamental issues regarding the next government's program, issues such as, for example, establishing regional self-administrations and separating the pension fund from the state budget. Therefore, the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] and the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL] are afraid that Klaus's party will not climb down from its demand for a majority in the government.

"Of course, we will continue to insist that the number of seats in the government is balanced—that is, that ODA and the KDU-CSL together have the same number of ministers as the ODS. Indeed, we are now in a more difficult position than Klaus. And the question is how much we can stand up to him," said a politician from Lux's People's Party.

Likewise, ODA is of the opinion that the strongest party is now in the driver's seat. "It has the advantage for Thursday's [20 June] talks because, so far, it has made concessions that we did not expect originally. Furthermore, it has climbed down relatively quickly," said a representative of the Alliance.

ODS Deputy Chairman Ivan Pilip confirmed yesterday that, on Thursday, the party will again insist on a majority. "In a situation where we have 68 mandates in the Chamber, it is hard to explain to our voters why we should have the same number of seats in the government as parties that, altogether, have 31 mandates. It is clear that the same arithmetic does not apply here and that the ratio will not be the same, but the ratio of forces is, after all, distinct and should be reflected in the ratio of forces in the government," said Pilip.

So, evidently, the situation will have to be resolved by the right of veto, which the ODS is proposing in order to rid its coalition partners of the fear that they will be outvoted in the Cabinet at any time. If ODA and the KDU-CSL were to accede to this proposal, no important material could go from the government to parliament without the agreement of all of the representatives of the coalition troika.

The ODS had drafted this option for a previous rou[illegible] talks involving coalition Chairmen Vaclav Klaus, [illegible] Lux, and Jan Kalvoda. "We are prepared to acquiesce to the right of veto for any coalition party. Of course, this must not concern details and all documents. We are prepared to define with an asterisk the materials that would have this statute," wrote Vaclav Klaus in the document he submitted to his coalition colleagues.

The Alliance and the People's Party have already made it clear that, in principle, they are not opposed to the right of veto, but they would much rather see a balanced governing cabinet. They point out, in particular, that the principle of the right of veto was contained in the last coalition agreement. It was, however, formulated so generally in this point that it was possible to submit draft laws to the deputies on which the whole coalition had not reached an agreement. For example, in the case of increasing the retirement age, this draft went to the Chamber of Deputies even though the People's Party had disagreed with it.

Slovakia: Daily Sees Last Chance for NATO Consideration

AU1906153996 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 19 Jun 96 p 4

[Commentary by Jan Skoda: "The Way (to NATO) Remains Blocked"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Through their well-meant advice, or, rather, well-meant and diplomatically correct words, our Western partners have been trying to tell us something: they keep dropping hints, providing explanations, producing examples—and we go on ignoring it all. This sort of thing happened again on Monday [17 June] at the official talks between Karsten Voigt, chairman of the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), and Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, who tried hard to convince the German Social Democrat that the blame for the poor international image of his coalition does not lie with Slovak reality, but with the way Slovak reality is perceived in the West.

Thanks to foreign visitors, the government coalition's foolish arguments, which used to obscure the very essence of our problem, have been demolished step by step. Voigt also pointed out where the essence of our problem lies: in our reality and in the Meciar style of government.

Thus, after last Monday we should drop the argument that the main reason NATO wants us as a member is in our unique geostrategic location, in the fact that our country happens to be at the crossroads of trade routes, and so on. Likewise, we should drop the argument that we have no control over anything because NATO has to come to an agreement with Austria first. The point is that we have been given a clear signal to the effect that the decision about our entry [into NATO] will not be determined by the above-mentioned geostrategic considerations, but strictly by the state of our democracy. In this context it is worth recalling what Voigt said to PRAVDA when asked whether Prime Minister Meciar's arguments had persuaded him: "Even if NATO did take geostrategic considerations into account, any expansion for geostrategic reasons would not be approved unless the issue of democracy was OK as well."

We should not seek comfort in believing that Slovakia is not different from the other three Central European countries which, unlike our country, are not omitted by the U.S. Senate draft bill on NATO expansion. Perhaps we are different from the others after all—why else should a high-ranking Western legislator feel obliged to explain to us the meaning of the term "democratic traditions"?

The sad truth is that it is precisely our way of thinking that makes us different from other countries. Therefore, instead of pursuing pointless arguments about the difference between the perception of reality and reality itself, we ought to keep asking ourselves whether our deeds genuinely enhance Slovak democracy.

Another myth was demolished with Mr Voigt's help when it was said that small countries are joining NATO not only to enjoy greater security and stability, but also to avoid the need for developing their own expensive defense systems. This fact should silence above all those who claim that neutrality, rather then NATO membership, would be the cheaper alternative for Slovakia.

To sum up: anyone willing to listen to the NAA chairman was told which way leads to NATO. Therefore we should be pleased that during his three-day visit to Slovakia Karsten Voigt was accompanied by Irena Belohorska, a government movement [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] deputy.

She is the very person responsible for the preparation of a report the NAA will get before the decision on the first round of talks on NATO expansion is made. Unless we take this opportunity, possibly our last one, then, of course, there will be the second round of talks—but when that will take place nobody knows.

Slovakia: Daily Rejects NATO Official's Lessons on Democracy

AU1906145096 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 19 Jun 96 p 1

[Commentary by Viera Urbanova in the "Public Matter" editorial column]

[FBIS Translated Text] Most of the representatives of political parties and movements in this country declare an interest in Slovakia becoming a member of NATO. The question is, however, how they are realizing this intention by means of their political activities at home and abroad. The North Atlantic Assembly [NAA] delegation's visit to Bratislava has laid bare the chronic ailments of the developments in Slovakia, ailments that have turned our country into a patient requiring permanent attention and treatment. Besides conferring with the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] chairman, the president, the prime minister, and the minister of defense, NAA Chairman Karsten Voigt also met with the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] chairman and other representatives of parliamentary opposition parties. At all these meetings, democracy was brandished in all shapes and variations. The idea was presented at the highest level that integration into NATO would reinforce democratic tendencies in our country, as Voigt considers democratic culture to be the main problem in our country, and in his opinion it is an illusion to think that only because of Slovakia's geostrategic position NATO bodies would overlook the Slovak Republic's internal problems with democracy. And so forth. We have also learned that some steps taken in Slovakia are not in conformity with the standards of NATO member countries. In this context the chief of NATO's parliament cited as examples the inadequate rights of the opposition, or the problem of public service television. Given the reality in some NATO member countries, the reflections about the state of democracy in Slovakia and about its compatibility with the standards of NATO member countries sound like an imposed self-serving cliche [nainfiltrovana ucelova fraza]. Or does Mr. Voigt intend to say that the attitude of Turkey, a NATO member state, toward its Kurdish minority is NATO's standard of democracy? And what about democratic culture? It is shaped not only by the coalition, but by the opposition as well. Voigt declared that there exists no secret agreement about Slovakia between NATO and Russia. However, talking about NATO's expansion without considering the interests of Moscow is a double illusion.

Democracy has become an argument that can always be put to use when deemed opportune.

Slovakia: Governing Coalition on Parliamentary Agenda

LD1906143096 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1200 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A coalition crisis is developing in the Slovak parliament. For the first time since the elections the year before last, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] of Vladimir Meciar has found itself isolated, without the backing of its coalition partners [the Slovak National Party, the Association of Workers of Slovakia and the Farmers' Party of Slovakia], because minor government parties have clearly made a deal with the opposition that the issues of widening the monitoring of the Intelligence Service, privatization, and state-run media should be included on the [parliamentary] agenda.

This in effect amounts to an attack on the main pillars of power of Meciar's HZDS.

Slovakia: Daily Sees Slota 'Endangered' by Conflict With HZDS

AU1906172496 Bratislava SME in Slovak 19 Jun 96 p 4

[Commentary by Marian Lesko: "What Is a Priority and What Is Just Wadding"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After their fourth round, the coalition talks have progressed so far that not even Jan Slota [chairman of the Slovak National Party; SNS] wants to say anything about them. He did not yield to journalists' entreaties yesterday because, supposedly, "the SNS definitely does not want to give cause for the breakup of this coalition. Excuse me, therefore, but I simply do not intend to answer your questions any more." From which it follows that, if Slota did reply, it could give cause for the coalition's breakup.

It is peculiar but, two and a half years ago, Ludovit Cernak said exactly the same thing. He, too, was SNS chairman then and, when journalists urged him to reveal how he got along with Meciar's movement, he said: "If I told you honestly what I think, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]-SNS coalition would break up." Today we know how it all ended—the coalition did not break up, but the SNS split. It split also thanks to Jan Slota, who, addressing a meeting of the SNS Central Council in January 1994, said: "In the new, the future cabinet to be set up after this Meciar cabinet is overthrown, Carnogursky is to be foreign minister and an ethnic Hungarian is to be deputy chairman of the National Council. I spit on such a cabinet. I do not want such a cabinet. That is a priority. Everything else is just wadding." Today Jan Slota is SNS chairman, from which a new priority automatically arises for him—not to permit the SNS to be an outsider in the government coalition. When his predecessor as SNS chairman Cernak tried to uphold this priority, his own party fired him. For many in the SNS, the alliance with the HZDS was far more important than the position of the SNS in this alliance. By demanding of Vladimir Meciar a new "quality" of the coalition, Jan Slota has found himself in a similar situation as Cernak before him. He is an endangered species in his own party. Too many people, including people in the supreme SNS leadership, need the coalition with Meciar's movement "at any price." That is, even at the price of the SNS remaining just an extra in it.

At present, no one knows the exact answer to the question of how many deputies of Slota's party will prefer the security resulting from alliance with the HZDS and, thereby, their own security, to the risky attempt to become a respected partner in this alliance. Only a vote, in which the will of Slota and the will of

Meciar will be pitted against one another, can provide this answer. By voting, SNS deputies will show where their priority lies. To quote a "classic," everything else is just wadding.

Slovakia: Warring Managers Conclude 'Gentleman's Agreement'

AU1906143996

[FBIS Report] Slovak newspapers on 15, 17, and 18 June report extensively on a "gentleman's agreement" concluded between the new and old managments of Slovenska Poistovna (Slovak Insurance Company; SP), the country's "most lucrative financial institution," and the resulting "calming down" of the struggle for control over the company. The new management was installed by the National Property Fund (FNM), the SP's majority shareholder, in which the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) has a majority, on 31 May, but did not assume office until 11 June because the previous management, supported by the Slovak National Party (SNS) and the Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS), contested the legality of its dismissal and prevented, with the help of security guards, the new managers from entering the SP headquarters.

Bratislava NOVY CAS in Slovak on 15 June on page 2 carries a 300-word report by "bud" entitled "Mikulas Trstensky Supposedly Is Not Giving Up." The report states that Mikulas Trstensky, the dismissed SP director general, and six other members of the old SP management "terminated their employment relationship with the SP by agreement yesterday." The report continues: "As SP Director General Edita Bukovska told NOVY CAS on this occasion, she concluded a 'gentleman's agreement' with her predecessor, in which both sides pledged to maintain correct relations. Mikulas Trstensky at the same time promised to withdraw all criminal charges that he had filed in connection with his dismissal. The employees' shareholding company set up by the former management with the aim of seeking the SP's privatization should be abolished as well. Asked whether she regards the present situation in the SP as the final settlement, Edita Bukovska replied: 'I do not know the exact reply, as the coalition talks continue. Mr. Trstensky himself said that his departure from the office does not mean that he is giving up, the struggle continues.'"

Bratislava PRACA in Slovak on 15 June on page 2 carries a 350-word report by "mai, TASR" entitled "Trstensky and Co. Have Something To Choose From; Agreement in SP." The report provides additional information on the "gentleman's agreement" concluded by Edita Bukovska and Mikulas Trstensky, the new and old SP directors general, at a meeting on 13 June. According to Bukovska, in addition to the pledge to withdraw all initiated lawsuits, the agreement also involves a deal on "the participation of the former management in the boards of directors and supervisory boards of companies, in which the SP has property holdings." As the PRACA report notes in this context, the SP is a shareholder in six banks (including a 72 percent share in Istrobanka), four insurance companies, nine investment companies and investment funds, three leasing companies, five tourism establishments, and three other joint stock companies. Moreover, according to Bukovska, the "two sides agreed not to publicize the events around the SP any more." The agreement on avoiding publicity also concerns the results of an inspection to be carried out in the SP. Based on the gentleman's agreement, Bukovska is quoted as saying, the former management will have the right to "deliver its opinion" on possible findings, but "the results of the inspection will not be published."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 17 June, in the KORUNA economic supplement on page V, carries a 2,000-word TASR report entitled "The New Management, Too, Is Interested in the SP's Privatization." The report, which is based on an undated interview with SP Director General Edita Bukovska, deals with the new management's plans to improve the company's reputation, tarnished by the recent events, and to regain the confidence of SP's clients and partners. Bukovska confirms the provisions of the "gentleman's agreement" with her predecessor, outlined above, saying that this agreement has "helped to significantly calm down the situation." Based on Mikulas Trstensky's instructions, she says, the OK-5 security agency left the building on 11 June and was replaced by the IBEA-3 security agency, the agency that had guarded SP's premises originally. In the NARODNA OBRODA item, Eva Bukovska also expresses the new management's interest in privatizing the SP: "Should privatization be announced, we intend to participate in it. In that case we will draw up the appropriate privatization projects," she is quoted as saying.

The "gentleman's agreement" between the new and old SP managements is also subject of several recent press commentaries. Bratislava PRACA in Slovak on 18 June on page 5 carries a 700-word commentary by Juraj Maslani entitled "The Investigation Is Over, Forget It!" The commentator points out that when the conflict over who should control the SP erupted, one of the main arguments used against the old management was "damage amounting to hundreds of millions of korunas" caused by its "mismanagement." Maslani calls it "somehow illogical" to retain the dismissed managers in companies that are co-owned by the SP, and wonders whether "the new management under Edita Bukovska is not risking further damage to the SP amounting to hundreds of millions."

Bratislava SME in Slovak on 18 June on page 4 carries a 400-word commentary by Robert Kotian entitled "Even Gentlemen Must Be Searched For." Kotian views the "gentleman's agreement" between two managements that had until recently considered one another illegitimate as illustrating "the two interests that hold the present coalition together—getting rich, and preventing anyone from finding out about it."

Slovakia: Commentary Urges Government To Heed Western Warnings

AU2006125196 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 19 Jun 96 p 9

[Commentary by Ivan Samel: "It Is High Time To Abandon the Slovak Specific Features in Understanding Democracy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During his visit to Slovakia, North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) Chairman Karsten Voigt informed his Slovak interlocutors that the decision by which countries NATO would be enlarged was no longer a question of an indefinite future, but of a few months. He told Slovak politicians in no uncertain terms that, with the present type of dominant political culture, Slovakia has no chance of joining NATO and that it will be precisely the criterion of democratic political culture and political style that will be crucial in selecting candidates for integration, but also for the ratification of this decision in the 16 NATO member states.

Voigt rejected the favorite assumption of Slovak political representatives that, for geostrategic reasons, NATO could not afford to exclude Slovakia from the integration process, arguing that, if such interests existed, they would play a secondary role in the decisionmaking process.

According to Karsten Voigt, the Slovak Republic still has integration chances, but it must itself take steps to ensure that its political methods are perceived as democratic in the structures into which it seeks to integrate. Such a chance is debatable, in his opinion, because some Republican congressmen in the U.S. Congress have already picked their favorites for integration—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. In their draft bill on financial support for integration, other countries are spoken of in only very vague terms.

Irena Belohorska, head of the Slovak Republic delegation to the NAA, reacted to this fact emotionally and in a piqued way: Decisions about us are being made without us and no one has come to ask what the situation in Slovakia is really like.

The reservations about the style of politics in Slovakia have not come out of the blue. They have been known for a long time, and the present government coalition has collected a long series of them, at the official level, in the form of statements and demarches during its 20 months in office.

Karsten Voigt said that he, personally, could do something to change the perception of the Slovak political reality in the NATO countries, where views on the enlargement issue are currently being shaped. Changing the Slovak political reality itself, however, is a problem for Slovakia and Slovak politicians.

The last months of Slovakia's chance to join NATO are passing by. It is apparent that this chance will not recur for many years. Already the 16th meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, which is opening today, should therefore start eliminating from the Slovak political reality the elements that make this reality unacceptable for standard democracies. This means, first and foremost, carrying out changes in the supervisory body that monitors the activity of secret services, in the composition of parliamentary bodies, and in mass media councils and the expeditious rejection of draft legislation such the Penal Code amendment. As a matter of fact, all of this should be in the interest of the government coalition itself because, without this, the government will scarcely succeed in implementing a priority of its policy statement—NATO entry.

If the members of the government coalition do not take the above steps, they should at least stop deceiving the public about the priorities of government policy. It would be enough to say "we are not interested" and we could go on plowing our own furrow, according to our own rules, without any Westerner meddling in our affairs.

Hungary: Foreign Minister, UDMR's Tokes on Minorities

LD1906223796 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Levente Sukosd has interviewed Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs in connection with the critical remarks of Bishop Laszlo Tokes [honorary chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania, UDMR] at the World Congress of Hungarians.

[Begin recording] [Sukosd] What do you think of the dispute that erupted at the World Congress of Hungarians and concerned you personally?

[Kovacs] I personally was concerned by just a small matter, a kind of an artificial storm. Bishop Laszlo Tokes staged a rather strong campaign against me, quoting an MTI report, which I had corrected earlier. [passage omitted]

[Sukosd] Do you think cooperation will be possible with Laszlo Tokes personally or with the World Federation of Hungarians [MVSZ], or will the present unpleasant relationship continue to exist?

[Kovacs] In the past two years the relationship between the government and the Foreign Ministry and certain ethnic Hungarian leaders and MVSZ leaders has developed in a rather one-sided way, because they have regularly criticized Hungarian foreign policy while we have not replied with similar criticism, because we feel responsibility for Hungarians beyond the border and for not making the situation of the ethnic Hungarian leaders more difficult. However, it is an uneven situation. [passage omitted]

Let me recall another objection from Bishop Tokes regarding Hungary's integration efforts, which concerns not just me but Hungarian foreign policy as a whole. He said earlier that he thought it would be tragic if Hungary joined Euro-Atlantic institutions before Romania. I then said that, in fact, it would not be a good thing. Hungary is interested in as many of its neighbors as possible joining the institutions more or less alongside Hungary. It would be advantageous for bilateral ties and for the ethnic Hungarians living there, because entry would mean that the countries admitted meet European standards. [passage omitted]

Hungary does not intend to slow down its own entry and wait for those who have not yet qualified for membership. And this is the difference between the position of Hungarian foreign policy and that of President Iliescu or Bishop Laszlo Tokes. Hungary's entry would not be disadvantageous to the Hungarians in Romania, Slovakia, Sub-Carpathia, or Vojvodina even if their countries—that is, the countries of which they are citizens—cannot join for the time being, because even then the Hungarians beyond the border would be able to rely on a Hungary whose security, stability, economic and social development, and modernization would be helped by the EU and NATO. [passage omitted]

[Sukosd] Expert talks on a basic treaty have now resumed in Bucharest. Do you expect any progress this year?

[Kovacs] I do not expect the expert talks to reach any agreement on the final wording. It would be a miracle and I do not believe in miracles.

[Sukosd] Following the local elections, there will be presidential elections in Romania this fall. Another campaign will begin.

[Kovacs] That is why I am saying that this period is not the most favorable one for making such a treaty. [passage omitted] [end recording]

[Sukosd] Let us hear the other side of the argument. My colleague, Zoltan Hortobagyi phoned Bishop Laszlo Toeks in Cluj. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Hortobagyi] Why do you think that Hungary's gaining membership in the EU first would affect the Hungarians of Romania in a negative way?

[Tokes] These are issues which can be affected by nuances. I did not wish my statement to create a conflict between Hungary and Romania regarding their European integration. [passage omitted]

The issue here, if such a question can be formulated, is: What is the price of this accession? If the West asks Hungary to ignore the question of minorities, or to make peace with the Romanians or the Slovaks at any price, than naturally, I reply that the forcing of European integration must not be allowed at this price.

[Hortobagyi] What do you mean by making peace with the Romanians and Slovaks? Can you not accept this as a condition?

[Tokes] I can accept this as a condition and I approve of the pressure from the West toward reconciliation. However, pressure should not be put on Hungary which, in my view, has been complying with the conditions of reconciliation for a long time, but pressure must be put on Romania. How come that the same yardstick is being used to measure the oppressor and Hungary, which is on the side of peace? Who exercises oppression against their minorities? Not Hungary. [passage omitted]

In many respects, the Hungarian foreign minister is uninformed about issues concerning the Transylvanian

Hungarians and Hungarians beyond the borders. This does not come as a surprise to me, he is a member of a political group which does not bother much about Hungarians beyond the borders. Thank God, he has lately been forced to get information on these matters. [passage omitted]

[Hortobagyi] My Lord Bishop, why did you choose the congress of the World Federation of Hungarians as a forum to air your anxiety? Would it not have been better to get in touch personally, perhaps on the phone, with the minister?

[Tokes] This is an issue of general criticism of a political trend and a certain kind of policy. Nobody should be surprised at my criticism, since I have been warning the Hungarian Government and Hungarian foreign policy for several months and years that—putting aside the complicated and tangled war of statements which has developed lately—the Hungarian Government and Foreign Ministry should recognize at last that the Hungarians over the borders and their representatives are becoming increasingly alarmed by the development of the Hungarian Republic's policy regarding them. [passage omitted]

A good example of this is the recent reception of [Slovak President] Michal Kovac in Budapest who, using the traditional means of conciliatory policitics, blinded the world to the fact that the situation of the Hungarians of Slovakia is deteriorating all the time. [passage omitted]

[Hortobagyi] Am I right in thinking that your relations with the Hungarian Government are rather cool? Is it possible to change this? Are you trying to change this?

[Tokes] I am striving to improve matters. The letters I have written to them would make up a huge volume. The last time I wrote to Prime Minister Gyula Horn was on 23 October. [passage omitted]

I feel that all my warnings go unheeded. Just the same as Gyula Horn, ignoring the indignation of the congress [of the World Federation of Hungarians], carried on with his speech uttering untruths—for example, saying that the relations with the neighboring countries influence the situation of the minorities positively, etc... [pauses] the prime minister does not take any notice and does not heed the warnings coming from the Hungarians beyond the borders. Believe me, the noise in the hall was a genuine expression of disapproval by the Hungarians beyond the borders and the present Hungarian Government has to take notice of this in its own and in our interests.

[Hortobagyi] How did you evaluate the world congress?

[Tokes] I feel that on the whole the work of the congress was successful. I feel that the launch of the national strategy program was a very significant step. [passage omitted]

However, I feel that the way the World Federation of Hungarians launched the program of nation policy is different to the way the present Hungarian Government interprets this policy. The Hungarian Government is very far from this kind of nation policy; it carries out an aid policy, a philanthropic policy in support of the minorities compared to the concept of our nation policy. [passage omitted]

However, I accept this, that is, if the Hungarian Government insists that it has an integral nation policy, this is good for us. [end recording]

[Sukosd] I interviewed UDMR Chairman Bela Marko in Bucharest. He only learned about the events at the Budapest World Congress from the press.

[Begin recording] [Sukosd] You did not attend the World Congress of Hungarians. Many people, among them State Secretary Csaba Tabajdi explained your absence as a possible symbolic stance against the MVSZ or the World Congress.

[Marko] It is out of the question. First, I was ill, and second, the second round of the local elections took place during the same weekend, so I could not go. I would have been pleased to attend.

[Sukosd] Some people say that the present dispute, the difference of views between Bishop Laszlo Tokes and the Hungarian Government, its ministers, and prime minister are unpleasant but necessary and inevitable. What do you think of this?

[Marko] In my opinion, clarifying debates are always necessary. I do not sense such a dispute situation between the MVSZ and the Hungarian Government. However, I must also say that I believe that when differences of opinion emerge between the Hungarian Government and an ethnic Hungarian organization over political issues, we should first try to settle these differences of opinion through personal contact, personal consultations. Thus, I do not consider a public dispute to be useful or necessary. [passage omitted]

[Sukosd] There was another debate at the World Congress, in which government officials claimed that Hungary has a nation strategy, the European integration strategy itself, while MVSZ officials claimed it is not enough, it can only be part of the nation strategy. What do you think?

[Marko] I would rather ask if the Hungarian Government has an elaborate and concrete concept regarding the situation of the Hungarians beyond the border.

[Sukosd] Has it?

[Marko] To be honest, I would not say no but I would not say a firm yes, either. [passage omitted]

First and foremost, Hungary should perhaps try to clarify how it sees the resolution of the fate of Hungarians beyond the border in the near future and in the distant future. I am not at all convinced that there is a clear answer to this question at the present moment. Obviously, it is very important to know what Hungarian foreign policy supports. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Hungary: Army Commander on Restructuring, Morale

LD1906154996 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A briefing has been held at the Defense Ministry on the situation and immediate tasks of the Hungarian Army. Krisztina Hadas reports:

[Hadas] Concentrated forces will have to be established instead of numerous small barracks with low staffing levels and low efficiency, Lieutenant-General Ferenc Vegh, the newly appointed commander in chief of the Hungarian Army, has said.

The 48-year-old new commander in chief considers it one of his greatest tasks to improve the situation of the increasingly indifferent and disappointed soldiers who have been struggling to make ends meet. They have to be dragged out of their pessimistic mood, Vegh said. He thinks that, despite his efforts, he will not be able to prevent a further drop in the number of professional staff in 1996.

The commander in chief promises predictability—not that everything will remain unchanged, but that those concerned will be informed about the reforms on time.

Speaking about army restructuring, he said that he will lay emphasis on qualitative rather than quantitative changes.

At the end Vegh said that conscription is a political matter and he will act in accordance with parliamentary decisions.

B-H: Commentary Suggests U.S. 'Impose' Defense Law

AU2006123996 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 19 Jun 96 p 3

[Unattributed commentary: "Three Chairs and a Minister"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Defense Law of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation is not coordinated and can only be envisioned on the agenda of today's Federal Assembly session with difficulty. In spite of the U.S. impatience—which, it seems, has been exhausted—the agreements signed allowing the speediest possible lifting of the embargo on (heavy) arms and the desire of numerous interested parties, this crucial document has not even reached the initial stage yet. For that reason, the demands that the Americans simply impose the law are growing increasingly louder.

Of course, nobody has officially come up with the idea of an imposition of the law yet. For the time being, this is still confined to discussion outside the official structures, however, as time goes by, it is gaining in weight. It appears that matters must be cut through and clarified in order to proceed further.

This primarily means a definition of the partnership relations. In the first place, there is the Croat partner's stance on what and how much it wants. To put it simply—on which chair will Federation Defense Minister Vladimir Sojic sit—in the Sabor of the Republic of Croatia, in "the government of Herzeg-Bosnia," or in the Government of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. He cannot sit on all three of them. This is not only our request. The world is more vocal here, stating that the strategy can only be build on clear premises. For that reason, perhaps, the appointment of the new "Herzeg-Bosnia government" is aimed at demonstrating what the current Croat interest is and where, in this context, the armed forces lie. The Croat partner indicates that his interest is "only his part of Bosnia" and the infrastructure there.

There have also been suggestions to put the uncoordinated law into the assembly procedure. It is not difficult to see what this could mean. The law would be returned because the clubs in the parliament would not be able to agree on it. This would mean another delay. To be precise—a return to the beginning and moving in a circle.

U.S. official James Pardew expressed disappointment in Sarajevo a few days ago that the Law on Defense had not been passed yet when "so little is needed" for this, as he assessed. There are many things in Bosnia for which "so little is needed" but which, nevertheless, do not happen. This is our fate here.

One of the essential issues here is the concept of Bosnia-Herzegovina's future. The Croat partner, the way things stand now, does not see and does not wish to see Bosnia-Herzegovina as their state. At this stage, according to the Croats, all the state prerogatives should end up in the hands of the entities. That is why the question of the civilian command, where the leading role of President Izetbegovic does not suit the Croat side, has become topical again. The excuse lies in the formal "arguments" that Izetbegovic is not an official of the Federation, but of the republic (which is being phased out). Therefore, their strategic goal is the desire to strip the republic of its powers on all fields, and most importantly, in the military sphere.

Here, politics collides with common sense.

The human dimension is unavoidable in all this. The defense law resolves the status of several tens of thousands of citizens in this country. Who has the legitimacy to play with their fates?

B-H: Officer Says 2,000 U.S. Troops To Redeploy

AU1906153396 Paris AFP in English 1509 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Lukavac, Bosnia-Herzegovina, June 19 (AFP)—In a first step towards a U.S. pullout from Bosnia, hundreds of troops from a key army logistics unit will this weekend start moving out of a base in northern Bosnia to a new site in Croatia, a US spokesman said Wednesday [19 June].

Some 2,000 troops will redeploy from their base at Lukavac some 70 miles (110 kilometres) further north in the first significant pull-out of U.S. forces since the peace implementation force (IFOR) moved into Bosnia last December, a U.S. officer said, asking not to be named.

Soldiers of the U.S. 1st Armored Division Headquarters, the Division Support Command and various liaison elements will start leaving their base at Lukavac on Sunday for a new base at Slavonski Brod in Croatia, the officer said.

A command and control headquarters will be established at the new site. The move, which heralds a wholesale withdrawal planned for later this year, is expected to be completed by July 15.

The balance of other units currently located at Lukavac will move between July 1 and August 1 to other U.S. camps in northern Bosnia. The timing of the move, which is expected to be completed by July 15, will coincide closely with the anticipated opening of the newly erected bridge over the river Sava at Slavonski Brod, a U.S. spokesman said.

In a statement issued Wednesday, the headquarters for the 20,000 U.S. troops based in northern Bosnia announced the move and said the "command and control headquarters at ... (the new) site will be well positioned to respond to the task force's logistical needs."

The U.S. officer, interviewed in Lukavac, said the redeployment was significant in that it is designed to pave the way for U.S. forces to leave Bosnia within the year, as promised to Congress by U.S. President Bill Clinton. Clinton is facing re-election later this year and wants to show that he will keep to his commitment on withdrawing U.S. forces.

The main U.S. headquarters in Bosnia, at an airbase outside Tuzla, close to Lukavac, will not be affected by the Lukavac redeployment. The United States sent some 20,000 troops into Bosnia in December last year as part of the 60,000-strong, 32-nation, NATO-led IFOR.

While other countries have started to hint in recent weeks that they might accept an extension of their mandate in Bosnia, Washington is keen to be seen keeping to the commitment to withdraw U.S. ground troops by the end of the year.

In a related development, IFOR will cease later this month providing an escort to traffic heading for the Gorazde pocket through Bosnian Serb territory in eastern Bosnia, a spokesman said in Sarajevo on Wednesday.

Major Simon Haselock told journalists that security on the Sarajevo-Gorazde route was good enough to obviate the need for the escort which Italian troops have been providing to vehicles wishing to cross Serb territory to reach the Moslem-Croat-controlled town. "We are satisfied now that the conditions existing on the Gorazde route, which as you know was a special case, make it possible to move forward to a normal way of traveling along that road," Haselock said. The escort will be discontinued from June 28, but IFOR will continue to monitor the "sensitive" route, the spokesman said.

B-H: IFOR To Discontinue Escort on Sarajevo-Gorazde Road

AU1906180196 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1549 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 19 Jun (BETA)—Representatives of the Implementation Force [IFOR] in Sarajevo have stated today that the traffic between Sarajevo and Gorazde will normalize as of 28 June and will not be escorted by convoys.

Such a decision was made after the assessment that "the state and degree of security on the road are satisfactory." IFOR, according to the Sarajevo-based ONASA news agency, will be controlling the road and patrolling it on a daily basis.

B-H: Muratovic, Clinton Envoy Discuss Airport, TV Stations

LD1906195396 Sarajevo BH PRESS in Serbo-Croatian 1754 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 19 Jun (BH PRESS)—Dr. Hasan Muratovic, president of the government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Foreign Trade Minister Neven Tomic had talks in Sarajevo today with Richard Sclar, President Clinton's special envoy, and the U.S. ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina John Menzies.

The talks covered the activities surrounding the opening of Sarajevo airport. Mr. Sclar said that full cooperation has been secured of all important international players and necessary resources earmarked for the first stage of reconstruction. Prime Minister Muratovic said that Malaysia and Turkey had offered technical assistance in opening the airport. It was said that the first charter flights are expected at Sarajevo airport on 15 July and that the airport is expected to start functioning normally by 15 September.

Special envoy Sclar asked about the implementation of a project to set up an alternative network of independent television stations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Muratovic said that the Bosnia-Herzegovina government has yet to receive the draft contract on setting up the network, stressing that the project would be superfluous unless the television signal can reach all the parts of the country.

B-H: Bosnian Serbs Shun First Meeting of Commission

AU1906195896 Paris AFP in English 1944 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, June 19 (AFP)—Serb representatives failed to turn up at the first meeting of a commission for the eastern Herzegovina region in southern Bosnia, which was outlined in the Dayton peace accords.

The commission should include representatives from towns in both of Bosnia's two entities—the Moslem-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska.

Michael Steiner, deputy to the top civilian representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Carl Bildt, and officials from the European Union, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the NATO-led Implementation Force and the World Bank were there.

Among the issues discussed were the results of last week's meeting on Bosnia in Florence, the elections due to be held in the Herzegovina town of Mostar on June 30 and those throughout Bosnia in mid-September.

Steiner said that while the implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton peace accords was going well the civilian aspects were proving harder to fulfil. He said there were problems with the return of refugees, freedom of movement, press freedoms and human rights.

The commission should include representatives from the Federation-controlled towns of Mostar, Konjic, Capljina and Stolac and the Republika Srpska towns of Trebinje, Nevesinje, Bileca, Kalionik and Ljubinje.

B-H: NATO Offers To Help OSCE Monitor Arms Ceilings

AU1906140596 Paris AFP in English
1400 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, June 19 (AFP)—NATO has offered to help the Organisation for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) monitor observance of heavy weapons ceilings in the former Yugoslavia, following a landmark agreement signed last week, diplomats said.

The western alliance's ruling body told Norwegian General Vigleik Eide, OSCE disarmament chief for the former Yugoslavia, that the NATO-led peace force in Bosnia could help verify compliance with the agreement, they said. The accord, negotiated in Vienna was signed in Florence, Italy, last week after a wrangle over titles between the Bosnian Government and rival Bosnian Serbs.

The agreement sets levels for tanks, armoured vehicles, fighter aircraft, helicopter gunships and artillery over 75-mm for Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and fixes the balance between Bosnia's two entities—a Moslem-Croat federation and a Serb republic.

NATO would provide the OSCE with information on the arsenals of Bosnia's former belligerents, the Moslem-led Bosnian Army, Croats and Serbs.

The United States and the Netherlands have offered to contribute to the cost of monitoring weapons levels in the region, diplomats added.

The talks also floated the idea of a UN body to coordinate efforts to control arms imports into the former Yugoslavia, which became legal on Tuesday. The United Nations imposed an arms embargo on the region on September 25, 1991 as the country disintegrated into its constituent republics. Lifting of the embargo was a source of bitter debate between the United States, which said the Bosnian army should be allowed to buy weapons to defend the country, and European states who feared it would deepen the conflict.

B-H: Bildt Interviewed on Bosnian Peace Prospect

AU1706115996 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ
in Serbo-Croatian 8-9 Jun 96 pp 1, 4-5

[Interview with EU Representative Carl Bildt by Sead Numanovic in Sarajevo on 7 June: "The Real Peace Has Not Been Achieved Yet"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"It would apparently be good if Karadzic and Mladic were arrested and appeared before the Hague Tribunal, and I would be glad if that happened, but I cannot say that all our problems would be solved by that. Our problems are much more than the presence of those two persons," Karl Bildt said in his interview to DNEVNI AVAZ.*

"As for IFOR [Implementation Force], they are working according to very precise (political) instructions. Their mandate is politically very precisely defined to prevent possible unpleasant effects, and none of the soldiers like that."

Carl Bildt, the EU representative to Bosnia-Herzegovina, gave an interview to journalists of the Italian paper LA REPUBBLICA, the French press agency AFP, and DNEVNI AVAZ in his Sarajevo office.

Bildt watched us through thin glasses, sipping iced tea, his hair carelessly combed back. Behind his back was a photograph of his two children, a girl and a boy, both Nordic blond like Bildt himself. There were also several pictures of UN soldiers. A huge printer and a laptop were on his desk. The office furniture was simple, the hallway was full of employees, the phones were not ringing, but the representative was more than busy.

[Numanovic] Will the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina be postponed?

[Bildt] If we postpone the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina for a certain period of time, the beginning of the establishment of joint institutions in this country will be postponed for the length of time. As I have said before, the present Bosnia-Herzegovina is the most divided country in the world, with the exception of Korea. I think, however, that no single place in the world is divided in a more difficult way than Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Therefore, we must think about the processes that are going on, the intention of which is to divide this country. One of the mechanisms for preventing that is the establishing of joint institutions. That will not solve all the problems, it will not solve some problems very soon, but it will slow down certain activities dividing the country. Therefore, the more we postpone the elections, the more difficult the process of reuniting the country will be. We cannot create ideal conditions for the elections, but I am very interested in creating joint institutions. Everything that is going on now is going on through this office. This is something like a system for keeping things going.

Dayton Is Misinterpreted

[Numanovic] Can sanctions affect changes in the Serb Republic?

[Bildt] First, I would like to say that all parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina are cooperating with us. Sometimes I say two, sometimes I have to mention three sides. You know, everybody is cooperative, but sometimes it happens that they all misinterpret the Dayton agreement, interpret it in a way different from what it actually means. That is not characteristic of the Serbian side only. However, my work is aimed at uniting, not dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina. I am careful not to contribute to the dissolution with a single step I make. That is the essence of the peace process. Our experiences with sanctions show us that they take a long time—if they work at all. The effect here became obvious only after 42 months. There were results, but it is a damned slow tool, let me put it that way. Furthermore, under certain historical circumstances sanctions are a tool that has no effect, and the normal effect of sanctions in the initial period is completely opposite to what sanctions are aimed at. A mentality of siege and spite is created. The actual effect of sanctions becomes obvious not after several weeks or months, but years.

[Numanovic] What if Karadzic and Mladic appeared before the Hague Tribunal?

[Bildt] That would apparently be good, and I would like to see that happen, but I cannot say that it would solve all our problems. Those problems are much more complicated than presence of those two persons.

[Numanovic] Still, would not others be—at least—more careful after Karadzic's and Mladic's example?

[Bildt] Yes, I believe that will be one of the effects.

[Numanovic] Are you hoping that IFOR is doing something about it?

[Bildt] IFOR is working according to very precise (political) instructions. Those, as you know, enable IFOR to extradite war criminal suspects under known circumstances. Their mandate is politically very precisely defined, and it prevents possible unpleasant outcomes, which none of the soldiers like. The American presence here is also stipulated by such a mandate.

[Numanovic] Talking about the Americans, are there any connections between the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the United States? What is your position in that situation?

[Bildt] My position has nothing to do with the U.S. presidential elections in any way. My main task is to establish joint institutions here, and that is one of the essential things in the upcoming elections.

[Numanovic] Will it be possible to establish common institutions even in Karadzic and Mladic remain in power?

[Bildt] No! They will not be in power, as they are not allowed to be candidates in the elections. However, that will not solve all problems. Of course, it will solve certain essential problems, like bringing the accused to court, but some problems will persist.

I would like to emphasize the importance of establishing common institutions. Once reestablished, they will mean a huge progress. The laws and constitutions here do not really make the situation clear. That is a mixture of old Yugoslav legal principles and modern European ones. For instance, the position of president and government and their capacities are not very clear here in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that is quite a strange phenomenon. However, that situation is created by the peace agreement that they, not we, have made. But the important thing is that the process goes in the good direction. That will not be easy, but it will work. You have to realize that a very complicated political system with a heterogeneous community has been established here. You have the Serb Republic on one side and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the other. And they are supposed to make one state.

People Have To Live Together

[Numanovic] According to certain prognoses, national parties will again beat everybody else in the upcoming elections. Do you believe they will cooperate?

[Bildt] They agreed to cooperate when they signed the Dayton agreement. They accepted that as their commitment. Besides, there is a strong logic that compels them to cooperate. The whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina must cooperate. That mechanism will someday dethrone the national parties. Just look at the map and the development of this part of Europe—and Bosnia-Herzegovina is a part of Europe. There is no way that the Serb Republic and Bosnia-Herzegovina could be separated. That just cannot be done. When I spoke to the Belgrade Serbs, I heard that they called the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina Bosnians, nothing else. That is my impression: There is something that could be called the Bosnian identity. Look at the map and take a walk through Bosnia-Herzegovina and you will see. That is not just about identity—there is also the economy, the mentality, the way people have to live with each other. Look at Banja Luka.

[Numanovic] What will happen if Karadzic and Mladic remain in the Serb Republic? Can the elections still be held, and will Karadzic have an undercover election campaign?

[Bildt] That is one of our doubts. What will happen in the Hague tribunal, I mean. Most probably, all journalists and networks will try to interview him, and that will give him a fresh chance to renew his political influence. That is our dilemma. It can only be solved by a trial—a fair trial—for Karadzic. The trial must explain to everybody—including those who helped him—what happened and what could happen, and distinguish between facts and allegations. In the long run, that will nullify the political influence of Karadzic and others.

[Numanovic] An important meeting will be held in Florence next week, and the first six months of the implementation of the Dayton Agreement will be discussed there. What did you write in your report?

[Bildt] I still have not written the report.

[Numanovic] Will you request sanctions to be brought against those that have not cooperated with the Hague tribunal—the Serb Republic, the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], and the Republic of Croatia?

[Bildt] I am not competent in issues concerning Croatia. Issues concerning the FRY and the Serb Republic are within my competence. As for Croatia, the Security Council must act there. You will know everything concerning the Serb Republic and the FRY after I write my report. That is an issue that should be taken care of on the official level before the information can be released. As for the report for Florence, I am preparing several reports. First, we are not satisfied with the situation of human rights in the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina, nor with the freedom of media. Of course, there has been certain progress, but there are still serious problems. The situation is better than during the war.

Human Rights

[Numanovic] Every situation is good compared with the war. Have there been any changes in the quality of the situation?

[Bildt] Yes, you are right about that. In human rights, for instance, the progress is far from satisfactory, and we are worried about that, especially for the state of human right issues in the Serb Republic and the Federation. That is the summary of one of the reports. The second report compares the situation one year ago and the present situation in general lines, and it will be ready at the beginning of next week. Among other things, I have used the UN reports on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in that period. Today is 7 June, and one year ago sharp—according to the UN report—their soldiers who had been held hostages by the Serbs were released. You have forgotten about that?

[Numanovic] No. Srebrenica is the current problem, and whatyou have mentioned was nothing but preparations for Srebrenica. I know that very well.

[Bildt] Probably yes, in a way. However, this report gives the number of shells that fell on Sarajevo, Bihac, Srebrenica.

[Numanovic] Is this a cease-fire or peace?

[Bildt] That is a good question. We have ended the war, but we have not achieved real peace yet. However, this is much more than a cease-fire.

[Numanovic] But less than peace.

[Bildt] Yes. It is actually a cease-fire if you still have weapons in your hands and you are ready to fight again. That is not the case here, because the demobilization process has been successful. I cannot say that weapons are gone, but they have been withdrawn and placed in barracks, and armed forced have been demobilized to a great extent. Nobody wants to start a new war. That is far more than a cease-fire, but the real peace still has not been achieved.

[Numanovic] Will there be a representative of the Serb entity within the Bosnian delegation in Florence? Did you discuss that with the Serbs in the meeting that was held a few days ago?

[Bildt] No, we did not discuss that, and according to the strange structure established by the peace agreement—I have mentioned that—Bosnia-Herzegovina is represented by its government and the governments of both entities. That is one of the reasons why we support the idea to form joint institutions as soon as possible.

[Numanovic] The Bosnian Government complains that donations and loans are coming too slowly. Will you ask the West to speed up the process when you go to Florence?

[Bildt] Yes. I would like to speed up the process, but thereare also problems on both sides. The Serb Republic blocks that process alone, when it comes to reconstruction of its economy, infrastructure.

[Numanovic] Is the Serb Republic under sanctions in a way?

[Bildt] No. There were sanctions until mid-February, and they have been lifted, and the Serb Republic leadership has caused themselves problems they could have done without. They could not understand that they could only contact the World Bank through the Bosnia-Herzegovina State Government. Such an attitude has caused difficulties and blocked some of those processes.

[Numanovic] Several days ago you said that the Americans were completely supportive. Has (Richard Sclare) come as your tutor or corrector, or does he have his mandate that is not directly connected with yours? Generally, has your position in Bosnia- Herzegovina become stronger or weaker since he came?

The Support of the United States

[Bildt] No. He has his mandate and I have mine. The difference is that he has come to coordinate American activities here that I do not coordinate. I am talking primarily of the USAID activities. Those are not within the "capacity" of the U.S. Embassy as an eminent political institution. My friends from Washington have told me that Mr. (Sclare) is an exceptionally good businessman, and I hope he will be very successful in that field, as well as in other bilateral activities. Many other states have such activities here, in close coordination with Bosnian institutions.

My position has not changed in view of Mr. (Sclare's) coming. I welcome his presence here, and I would be glad to see more of such people here.

I am not implying that there are any problems with the American help here. No. Definitely not.

[Numanovic] What are the priorities in the reconstruction?

[Bildt] The absolute priority is the infrastructure—there cannot be any progress in economy without that. What I would like to have here is a self-sufficient Bosnian economy, not a construction dependent on international help. Furthermore, there is the reconstruction and improvement of electric power supply system. Many things depend on that, from the revival of big industrial companies to middle and small enterprises, heating and lighting. Even traffic, in a way. Everything is all right now, but we are due to have trouble in winter if those issues are not taken care of by then. The system was seriously damaged in the war. We have plenty of work to do.

Telecommunications have to connect people. We cannot expect people to live together if they cannot communicate. Even in the divided Berlin, during the coldest Cold War, there were telephone lines between the two parts of the city. It was complicated, limited, but still possible. Here people see each other, but they cannot communicate, except by shouting or smoke signals.

[Box, p 5]

There Are No Disagreements With Steiner

[Numanovic] According to DER SPIEGEL, there are some disagreements between you and Mr. Michael Steiner.

[Bildt] Are there? I have not noticed any.

[Numanovic] Is that true?

[Bildt] No. I have not seen that text.

[Numanovic] So, that is not true?

[Bildt] No.

[Box, p 5]

Just a Fabrication

[Numanovic] The Bosnians are very curious about your alleged relationship with a certain girl from Pale named Jugoslava?

[Bildt] I am curious about that myself. That is just a fabrication, and I find it very insulting to publish stories without proving facts. That is utter nonsense.

[Box, p 5]

Ancient History for Europe

[Bildt] All traffic communications need to be reestablished. There is no exchange of goods without that, and the economy is feeble. At the present moment we have traffic which is not exceptionally good, but it still functions, and we have exchange of goods. The repair of roads will increase the economic capacity of the country. There is also the quick rehabilitation of small businesses, good tax and customs policy, which might be a problem, because everybody used to put checkpoints and collected whatever fees they wanted. That is ancient history for Europe.

B-H: Sources Report Carl Bildt To Be Relieved 'by Mid-July'

LD1906160096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1410 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 19 Jun (SRNA)—Carl Bildt, the international community's high representative in former Bosnia-Herzegovina, will be relieved of his duties by mid-July, SRNA has learned from diplomatic sources in Belgrade.

According to the same source, strong U.S. pressure has led to the decision to replace Bildt because Washington feels that his activities in Bosnia have been counterproductive.

"The Americans think that Bildt has lost the battle against the [Bosnian] Serb leadership in Pale and that the major part of the international community does not trust his mission any more," SRNA's source said.

The unidentified diplomat added that Washington was particularly concerned because of "delays as regards the deadlines for the implementation of the civilian part of the [Dayton] agreement, Bildt's clumsiness when dealing with former [Bosnian] Serb Premier Rajko Kasagic, as well as the inadequate preparations for the forthcoming elections."

B-H: Murativic Chairs Meeting on Cooperation With ICO

AU1706154096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 17 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A session of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was held today; Prime Minister Muratovic chaired the session. The government reviewed current issues pertaining to foreign relations, finances, and administration.

The Government discussed the state's cooperation [words indistinct] economic and cultural organizations with the Organization of the Islamic Conference [ICO] member countries, the organization's institutions and ICO governments, and adopted the platform for the government delegation's participation at the fourth meeting of the group for the mobilization of aid for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The government also adopted the proposal for the agreement on economic, scientific, and technological cooperation between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government and Kuwait, and the basis for negotiations and the signing of an additional agreement [words indistinct] between Austria and the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on social security that is being implemented by Austria and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The government presented its view on the proposal of the federal law on basic rights of the war disabled and families of killed soldiers, and adopted the proposal for joint activities of the federal and republican finance ministries in regard to the functioning of customs offices on the territory of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. [passage omitted]

B-H: Muratovic, Prlic Address ICO Aid Conference

AU1806163796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 18 Jun 96

[Report by Samir Huseinovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Word indistinct] meeting of the ICO [Islamic Conference Organization] Group for the Mobilization of Aid for Bosnia-Herzegovina opened with Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic addressing the guests. After expressing his pleasure at the impressive number of ICO members attending the talks, Prime Minister Muratovic spoke of the primary tasks that are facing us in the (?post-Dayton) period. He particularly touched upon the importance of reconstructing our country or, to put it more precisely, the economic reconstruction that began thanks to the donations to a large degree by Islamic countries themselves. According to Prime Minister Muratovic, the basic tasks are to renew the (?infrasructure), ensure conditions for employment, rebuild housing, and refugee return.

The prime minister if Bosnia-Herzegovina presented our country's basic [word indistinct] regarding the activity of the Group for the Mobilization of Aid for Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereby the founding of a fund to finance reconstruction, production, and employment was suggested.

Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Jadranko Prlic addressed the meeting, recalling that peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina was still unstable and freedom of movement restricted, which was having a negative impact on the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He pointed to the role of the international community, particularly IFOR [Implementation force], which should help solve these problems. Minister Prlic pointed to the need for the assistance of the ICO, particularly in the spheres of reconstruction, defense, and (?ensuring) human rights.

In the continuation of the meeting of the Group for the Mobilization of Aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina, a program of work was put forward, including new [word indistinct] of the ICO and cooperation with Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as talks on defense, economy, and human rights. The Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation to this meeting is headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Hasan Dervisbegovic and Army General Rasim Delic, chief of the General Staff, is also attending. Today's meeting is attended by, among others, delegations from Turkey, Iran, [word indistinct], Kuwait, and Malaysia.

The meeting of the Group for the Mobilization of Aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina is to continue tomorrow and it is planned that prominent ICO delegations on 20 June visit Mostar and Tuzla, where they will be presented with [word indistinct] that directly concern the problems of these regions.

B-H: Turkish, Local Businessmen Sign $23-Million Contract

AU1706154596 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 17 Jun 96

[Report by Samir Huseinovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Name indistinct], general manager of the Turkish [name indistinct] company, and Energoinvest general manager Edib Bukvic, in the presence of Presidents Izetbegovic and Demirel, signed a joint investment contract [word indistinct] and the forming of a joint company. Additional contracts, which set out the firms' tasks and share of investments, were signed in Eneorgoinvest's business center. Samir Huseinovic has the details:

[Huseinovic] The contract in question is worth $22.6 million. The financial assets will come partly from the founding capital and partly through bank loans. Energoinvest's share of the investment, and the share of its subsidiaries in France and Turkey, amounts to $4.5 million. Energoinvest will secure the largest part of its share through providing engineering services and technology transfer for the production of [word indistinct]. Here is what Eneorginvest general manager Edib Bukvic said after the signing of the agreement:

[Begin Bukvic recording] In our view, this is the largest project undertaken by the two states in the last 100 years, although we are not sure that there was ever a project of this magnitude. This is, so to speak, an absurd situation, in which Energoinvest, that is, the Bosnian economy is investing in a plant in Turkey. However, the contract implies that we can soon expect a return of substantial means from the plant, as this is a product much sought both on the Turkish and [word indistinct] markets. I think the negotiations were lengthy, there were lots of problems, but I believe that we have partially solved them; I say partially, because the real problems are yet to arise with the realization of such an important contract, an investment worth some $23 million, which has to be completed in the next 18 months. [end recording]

[Huseinovic] According to the contract signed today, the construction of the plant whose capacity is to be an annual 50,000 metric tons, is to begin in the fall. The initial quantities of the product should appear on the market in the summer of 1998.

B-H: Ganic Seeks To Replace Prlic in Response to Croat Move

LD1906155396 Mostar Radio-Televizija Mostar Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1430 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency member Ejup Ganic has launched an initiative to replace Jadranko Prlic, minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, ONASA news agency has learned from well-informed sources close to the state presidency. The reason for launching this initiative is the fact that the self-styled Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia appointed its new government last Saturday.

According to ONASA, Ganic and President of the Bosniak-Croat federation Kresimir Zubak reached a gentleman's agreement at a session of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 12 February this year, according to which the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina was given the post of foreign minister in the government formed by [Prime Minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina] Hasan Muratovic, on condition that the government of the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia ceased to exist.

This agreement was violated by the appointment of the new government in [Croat-held] western Mostar.

B-H: Ganic Criticizes Prlic Over 'Government' Reshuffle

AU2006111996 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 20 Jun 96 p 3

[Report by S.L.: "To Face the Truth"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Federation and member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, did not want to either refute or confirm the information released by the ONASA press agency announcing that he would initiate a procedure for the removal of Jadranko Prlic, foreign minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In a statement to the press, Ganic recalled a portion of his address at the Federal Assembly meeting held on Wednesday. He reproached the Foreign Ministry of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is headed by Prlic, for not having informed the members of the Contact Group and those states that are friendly to the Federation about the reshuffle of the government of the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia.

Ganic stated that this issue must be raised and the truth must be faced. He claimed that many diplomats asked him whether "that structure has been reinstated, and whether a certain Markovic, known for this and that, is the prime minister of Herzeg-Bosnia." They did so because they were not able to obtain the necessary information from the Foreign Ministry.

He recalled the agreement with the Croat partner in the Federation according to which the Croats were supposed to give up Herzeg-Bosnia and, in return, republican and federal functions would be integrated. Consequently, Ganic pointed out that "we have satisfied Prlic, who is one of the architects of the government of Herzeg-Bosnia." Prlic was appointed foreign minister, which the vice president of the Federation sees as one of the best functions in the state.

B-H: UN's Ivanko Warns of Croat Separatist Tendencies

AU2006095796 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1848 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb, 19 Jun (BETA)—UN spokesman Aleksandar Ivanko stated in Zagreb today that it is necessary to extradite Radovan, Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic; General Ratko Mladic, army commander of the Serb Republic; and Dario Kordic, former chairman of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague.

Ivanko said at a news conference that Karadzic, Mladic, and Kordic were "the main obstacle to the coming elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina." He said that the UN police in Bosnia have had most problems with the police of the Bosnian Croats, and expressed the fear that "separatist tendencies are growing" in Herzeg-Bosnia. "Kordic still has a great influence on policy-making," Ivanko said, adding that the reshuffle of the government of Herzeg-Bosnia has "a negative impact on the peace process."

The UN spokesman added that the international community had problems with the Muslim side as well, and that members of the Party of Democratic Action often speak in terms of a Muslim state, forgetting about the Serbs and Croats.

B-H: Croat Official Sees Work as Solution to Problems

AU1806185596 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1632 GMT 18 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Mostar, 18 Jun (BETA)—Mijo Brajkovic, mayor of the west, Croat part of Mostar, has said to BETA today that his name is again on the elections list of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) list for the local elections in Mostar.

Jadranko Topic, chairman of the HDZ of Mostar, said recently that Brajkovic would not run in the elections for that party in Mostar. "I was not going to, and now I am again," Brajkovic said.

Asked what he expected from the elections, and whether they would affect the present division of Mostar, Brajkovic said that the elections would not change the situation in the city, but they could bring more of a democratic spirit into it.

In connection with the relations within the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he said that the transformation of Herzeg-Bosnia should be gradual and that "Herzeg-Bosnia should weaken with the strengthening of the cantons and the federation." "However, you see that (the cantons and the federation) are not strengthening," Brajkovic said, adding that "one should hope that they will—that is what we agreed, that is what we signed."

Brajkovic believes that the best solution for both nations is to start working. "Without work there will be nothing. Politics amounts to nothing if people do not work," Brajkovic said in an interview with a BETA reporter.

B-H: SDS Deputy Says Karadzic To Represent Party in Elections

AU2006110696 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 0752 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 20 Jun (BETA)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic (RS), will be the candidate of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) at the forthcoming elections, today's issue of DNEVNI TELEGRAF reports.

SDS Deputy Stevan Milic stated the following for the paper: "We will elect the best, and Karadzic is the best. If he does not accept it, we will force him to do so because we have no one better."

RS Vice President Biljana Plavsic stated for DNEVNI TELEGRAF that the top candidate will be known after the party's election convention, which will be held on St. Vitus day, 28 June.

"If IFOR [Implementation Force] tries to arrest Karadzic in the meantime, our response will be very strong and this is in fact why we are not worried whether they will try to do it or not," Biljana Plavsic said.

B-H: Main Parties Participating in Elections Profiled

AU2006081496 Belgrade BETA in English 13-20 Jun 96

[BETA commentary: "Elections in Bosnia: The Ruling Parties Are the Favorites"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] By June 14, 45 political parties submitted their election registrations.

In the meeting concerning the implementation of the Dayton Accord, held in Florence on June 13, it was concluded that the preparations for the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina are proceeding according to the schedule and that the elections will be held probably on September 14.

Possibly the strongest voice in support of keeping the election deadline came from Washington on the day when the Florence meeting was held. In it, U.S. President Bill Clinton said: "We have agreed that for further progress in Bosnia it is necessary to hold the elections in September, as provided by the Dayton Accord."

The Serb side expressed its content with the results of the Florence meeting. The Republic of Srpska's [Serb Republic] (RS) Prime Minister, Gojko Klickovic, stated that "the RS was treated as an equal partner," stressing that such approach was owed mainly to the chief of Italian diplomacy, Lamberto Dini. Speaker of the Bosnian Serb Parliament, Momcilo Krajisnik, said that the Florence conference "has in a way confirmed the RS statehood," as the Serb delegation was given the opportunity to express its views.

The Bosnian Serbs were especially content with the fact that an agreement on arms restriction in the former Yugoslavia was signed in Florence on June 14, bearing also a signature of the RS Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aleksa Buha. The signing of the agreement has twice been postponed, because the authorities in Sarajevo kept rejecting the idea of the Republic of Srpska being one of its signatories. However, after Sarajevo had been exposed to additional pressure, the agreement was finally signed.

Coalitions

A day after the Florence meeting, a true race of political parties and coalitions for the election registration started. The deadline was 7 p.m., June 14. According to the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] data, announced on June 15, 45 parties from both entities have been registered altogether.

To the Regional Headquarters of the OSCE Temporary Election Commission in Banja Luka, the application forms of 17 parties arrived, out of which four applied for municipal elections only. According to the documents submitted, all of them have succeeded in obtaining the necessary 10,000 signatures, thus meeting the requirements for their participation in the elections.

Previous assessments showed that the majority of the parties will prove unable to met these requirements. It seems that there were a lot of people who placed their signatures on the documents of different parties. It is widely rumored in Banja Luka that voters were given money in exchange for their signature.

Among the parties registered for the Serb entity is, of course, the ruling Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), along with the Socialist Party of the Republic of Srpska (SPRS), the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), the Serbian Unity Party (SSJ), the Democratic Patriotic Bloc (DPB), and a number of smaller parties.

All parliamentary parties in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina submitted their applications. Among the favorites are the newly established Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH), of former Prime Minister, Haris Silajdzic, who is the main rival of the ruling Party of Democratic Action (SDA).

Five opposition parties have created a coalition and will run in the forthcoming elections under the name of the "Joint List of Bosnia-Herzegovina." A coalition agreement was signed by the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Union of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Social Democrats (UBSD), the Muslim Bosniak Organization (MBO), Croatian Agrarian Party (HSS) [Croatian Peasants' Party], and the Republican Party (RP).

These are the parties of a strong opposition orientation which are expressly against parties being organized in national blocks and are advocating a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina. Among them the most influential is the UBSD, headed by the Tuzla mayor, Selim Beslagic.

The Democratic Popular Party (DPP), of the former Muslim leader in Western Bosnia, Fikret Abdic, was also registered. It submitted its application in Mostar, while Abdic is registered as a candidate for a member of the future Bosnian Presidency, in which there will be one representative for each of the three Bosnian peoples. Abdic enjoys support of the Croatian authorities. Zagreb is wishing for and expecting his success particularly in Herzegovina and western Bosnia.

Similarities and Differences

Observers hold that the winners are almost certainly to be found in the three ruling parties—the SDA, the SDP, and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). If given stronger media support, the SPRS, in the Serb entity, and the SBiH of Haris Silajdzic in the Federation can hope to achieve something in the elections, while among the Bosnian Croats, besides the HDZ, there is no other serious political force.

The relations between the ruling parties and their most serious election rivals in both entities are similar. Both the socialists in the RS and the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Federation are partially composed from the ruling parties' dissidents, while their respective programs have a strong national tone. This means that in order to achieve a victory in the elections both parties have strongly emphasized national goals: Their eventual victory in the elections will possibly bring only a little more dialogue between the Bosnian peoples, but no radical changes in the extremely tense relations are to be expected.

Both the socialists and the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina are under strong pressure of the ruling parties. On several occasions, especially in the Teslic region and in the cities of eastern Bosnia, the socialists were physically attacked. The same happened to Silajdzic last weekend in Cazin, at a rally organized by his party.

Both Silajdzic and the socialists are conspicuously attempting to present these assaults as a proof that their policies are essentially different from the ruling parties' policies and are trying to convince the voters that they are victims of physical attacks because of being potential winners.

The socialists have very skillfully ventured onto a campaign of absorbing the parties whose orientation is similar to theirs. Thus, last weekend in Banja Luka a coalition of the Center and the Left was established; the Party of Independent Democrats, of Milorad Dodik, the Yugoslav United Left for the RS, and the Social Liberal Party of Miodrag Zivanovic, along with two almost unknown parties—the Party of Private Initiative and the New Workers Party—are the members of this new alliance.

The absolute masters of the newly established coalition are, of course, the socialists, and they will be offered an opportunity to sovereignty determine what will be the degree of influence of each one of these parties. It is almost certain that the Yugoslav United Left (JUL) will fare the best, being in close relation with the socialists in Serbia as well. The influence of this party among the Bosnian Serbs is very limited, but, much like in Serbia proper, and owing to the media support, it may yet significantly increase.

Dodik and Zivanovic entered the coalition virtually having no other choice. On their own, they would probably have no chance of winning a single seat. The socialists also see as their partial interest the cooperation with these two politicians, who have good reputation with the international community and strong ties with similar parties in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the same time, it would be easier to control them within a coalition.

Except for this block, the Democratic Patriotic Block, headed by the Banja Luka major, Predrag Radic, can also hope to win some seats in the future RS Parliament. The block has rather good chances in Bijeljina, where it was established. In all likelihood, Radic will not have much success in Banja Luka, where according to the general belief, the socialists will prevail.

In the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, except for the SDA and Silajdzic's party, only the block gathered around the UBSD can expect to gain something in the elections. The block can count on votes from the Tuzla region, and, partially, in Sarajevo, but not even its leaders are convinced that it is capable of endangering the ruling party. For the time being, there are no serious intimations on a future coalition between this block and Silajdzic's Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Croatia: Ministry Issues 'Official' Stand on Herzeg-Bosnia

AU1906144796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Croatian Foreign Ministry today announced the official stand of the Republic of Croatia on the occasion of the most recent events in the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia about the [word indistinct] constituting the new government. The statement was issued at the insistence of Nada al-Issa, BH PRESS correspondent in Zagreb:

[Al-Issa] It was officially announced in Zagreb today that the Republic of Croatia officially supports the most recent reconstruction, that is, constituting a new government in the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia with the official explanation [word indistinct] of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that such a decision cannot be considered contrary to political agreements reached by the federal partners and representatives of the two peoples.

The official announcement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that I obtained after persisting the entire morning says further the following: The reconstruction of some administrative structures in the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia does not mean constituting a new government but, it is claimed, a step toward reducing the number of administrative bodies. [words indistinct] that it will help the agreed transferring of jurisdiction onto the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but that it is at the same time necessary to contimue ensuring the further functioning of the legal and economic system on the territory of the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia.

Croatia: Opening Consular Sections in Zagreb, Belgrade Discussed

LD1906170696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1508 GMT 19 Jun 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, June 19 (TANJUG)—Head of the Yugoslav Office in Zagreb Veljko Knezevic and Croatian Foreign Ministry Secretary Zoran Piculjan on Wednesday [19 June] discussed preparations for opening consular sections at the Yugoslav Office in Zagreb and the Croatian Office in Belgrade.

The two sides agreed that expert groups of the Yugoslav and Croatian Foreign and Interior Ministries and representatives of the two countries' customs administrations should meet in Zagreb on June 24.

Members of the expert groups will review the field of consular sections' activities on the basis of minutes, which Foreign Ministers Milan Milutinovic of Yugoslavia and Mate Granic of Croatia signed in Zagreb in mid-March.

Croatia: Commentary Views U.S. Plan To Rearm Bosnia

AU1406132196 Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 14 Jun 96 pp 12-13

[Commentary by Mario Galic: "Bosnia-Herzegovina Army With U.S.-Made Abrams Tanks Will Become a Powerful Force!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The implementation of the political part of the Dayton agreement is progressing very slowly. So far, very little has been done and it is still not known when the much vaunted elections will take place, since there are still not even the basic conditions for holding them. All the attempts of the world community to remove Karadzic and Mladic permanently from the political stage, through the mediation of its representative Carl Bildt, have not yielded any significant results. Moreover, almost on a daily basis the followers of these Bosnian Serb leaders organize meetings all over Bosnia-Herzegovina in support of them. At the same time, Milosevic "cannot see the link between the elections and the departure of Karadzic and Mladic from office."

Although the political solution in Bosnia-Herzegovina is as far away as it was before the Dayton agreements were signed, the military part is developing more or less successfully. The fighting has completely ceased and the military units have been separated. The American plan to arm the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is also developing with relative success. Thus, toward the end of May, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina chose a private U.S. company, Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) as its major advisory partner in the program "Train and Equip." Among other tasks, the MPRI experts will be coordinating the delivery and distribution of arms and equipment to the armed forces of the Federation.

Machine Guns Have Arrived

Certain shipments of these weapons have already arrived in Bosnia, including 49,000 small arms with long barrels (rifles, machine guns, and so on) intended for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. They have not yet been distributed, because U.S. sources claim that within the army there are still a number of Islamic fundamentalists from Iran, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and other Islamic countries. The "Train and Equip" program will only start being implemented when all of them leave the territory under the control of the Sarajevo government. Some 200 officers of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army who have gone to Turkey for training are not a part of this program, but part of a special agreement between Sarajevo and Ankara. All warrant officers and commissioned officers on the U.S. program to arm and train the Federation forces will be trained either in the United States or in Bosnia-Herzegovina itself.

The just under 50,000 rifles and other small arms represent but an insignificant part of the weaponry that is to come to the Federation. By the end of this year, according to the announcements so far, tanks, combat helicopters, infantry combat vehicles, self-propelled and towed artillery, as well as other weapons and equipment, will have arrived in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. These weapons, according to statements by top U.S. officials, will be mainly distributed to Bosnia-Herzegovina Army units, because the army is the weakest part of the Federation armed forces, so its strengthening would result in a balance of power. But will such arms bring the expected result?

Hardly, because, according to the announcements so far, America will be delivering the most modern weaponry, which will, in the still very shaky political arena of Bosnia-Herzegovina, lead to a serious disruption of the balance of power. That is, it will lead to the diametrical opposite of what U.S. policy is officially striving for. The U.S. plan for rearming also involves the delivery of 40 of the most modern M-1 Abrams tanks. This number in itself does not seem very large, particularly considering that the Serbs in Bosnia have more than 350 tanks, compared with the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army's 30 or so. However, one must also take into account the great difference in quality between the M-1 Abrams and the tanks used by the Serb paramilitaries. At the moment, the best tank of the Serb forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the M-84. A comparison of the combat abilities of the Abrams and the M-84 shows the great inferiority of the latter. The firepower of both tanks is just about the same. The Abrams has a 120-mm gun, while the M-84 has a 125-mm gun. However, the Abrams is equipped with a much more modern and much more efficient aiming system (SUP).

The Abrams Is Better Than the M-84

In daylight and in conditions of good visibility, the SUP features of both tanks are approximately identical. But the Abrams SUP has far better features in conditions of significantly limited visibility, when night, fog, heavy rain, and suchlike make the use of standard battlefield observation systems impossible. In addition, the Abrams SUP can pinpoint targets at night in dense forest and through heavy smoke without any problems, while in the same conditions the M-84 observation systems have major operational difficulties. In practice, that means that the Muslim Abrams tanks would have a great advantage in Bosnian conditions, particularly in the heavily forested parts of Bosnia.

And while to some extent one can compare the firepower of the Abrams and M-84 tanks, the level of the armor protection is so different that it makes them unequal adversaries. The whole bodywork of an Abrams is made of multilayered armor, which is thicker than one meter in places. The M-84 has only the chassis made of similar armor, while the turret is made of traditional steel. The difference in the armor protection was best illustrated during the liberation of Kuwait from the Iraqi occupation, when none of the U.S. Abrams tanks encountered any major problems with direct hits by Iraqi T-72 tanks, which have the same gun as the M-84. None of the T-72 tanks survived a hit from the Abrams 120-mm gun. The T-72's armor is almost identical to the M-84's, since the latter was developed from the former. The Abrams's multilayered armor is particularly resistant to guided armor-piercing missiles. The Americans even claim that no current armor-piercing guided missile can pierce its armor. This claim is probably exaggerated. But the claim that no army of the states that have appeared on the territory of former Yugoslavia has an antitank rocket that could destroy an Abrams tank is not exaggerated.

The only real advantage of the M-84 over the Abrams is its lighter weight. The M-84 weighs in at 42 metric tons, while the Abrams is 54.5 metric tons. Thanks to a powerful turbine engine with 1,500 horsepower, the Abrams can reach a maximum speed of 72.4 km/h, 7.5 km/h faster than the M-84. But one problem lies in the bad Bosnian roads and bridges, which can hardly support such weights. But the successful use of Abrams tanks by the Americans within IFOR [Implementation Force] shows that such problems are soluble.

Budget for Training

The Abrams tank is an offensive weapon, and there is no doubt that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, if it gets a chance to, will use it as such. The tactics of tanks dictate that they should be concentrated in a certain area so that by their large number in a small area their heavy firepower and mobility can be exploited. Forty Abrams tanks will enable the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army to form at least four tank regiments of 10 tanks each, which is sufficient to pierce the enemy defense lines in four different places on the Bosnian front line and create wedges as the basis for further penetration. The task of these Abrams will be easier if the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army also gets the most modern AH-64 Apache combat helicopters. According to some reports, the Bosniak army could get as many as 30 of these excellent combat aircraft. This number is probably too high for two simple reasons. First, neither the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army nor the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] has enough helicopter pilots and technicians who would be able in a very short period of time (by the end of this year) to learn how to fly and maintain these sophisticated helicopters. The second reason is even more pragmatic. One Apache costs over $25 million, so 30 Apache helicopters would cost over $750 million. The entire budget for the arming and training of the Federation armed forces amounts to $800 million. That means that almost four-fifths of all the money envisaged for the purpose would be spent on the Apache helicopters. It is more likely that only one squadron of these combat helicopters (most probably six helicopters) will have reached the Federation by the end of the year.

Put to good use, six Apaches can greatly influence the outcome of combat operations. Thus, for instance, one Apache alone can carry up to 16 antitank Hellfire missiles or 76 guided 70-mm rockets. The Hellfire is guided toward its target by a radar beam (it follows its reflection), which can be directed from the helicopter itself or from some other platform (another helicopter, a reconnaissance vehicle on land, or an infantryman with a laser marker). The maximum range of the Hellfire is 8,000 meters. The standard Apache armaments system consists of eight Hellfires, 38 guided rockets, and a 39-mm gun with 1,200 shells. The real value of this helicopter is not so much in its weaponry, although that is also exceptionally effective, but in its excellent electronic devices for observation and fire guidance. This electronic system enables it to fly and detect targets by day or night, and in all weather conditions. At this moment, the Apache has no competitor in the skies above Bosnia-Herzegovina, because neither the Serbian Gazelle nor the Croatian Mi-24 helicopters have comparable combat features, particularly at night or in bad visibility. In specific Bosnian conditions (particularly the mountainous regions), the highly mobile Apaches are more efficient combat aircraft than the majority of modern combat aircraft. In addition, the hills covered in forests can be used as cover until the moment of the attack on a target, after which they can quickly withdraw.

The Abrams tank and the Apache helicopter show their real value only when they operate in tandem. Then they cover each other and one or two Apaches can destroy the enemy's tanks before the Abrams come into play. After that, the Abrams can destroy less dangerous targets and penetrate the enemy's defenses.

Apart from these, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army may also be given what might seem at first glance some less important weapons, such as the combat personnel carriers the M2 Bradley. But that is not so if we bear in mind that the overall combat value of a Bradley (armor protection, mobility, and firepower) is approximately that of a T-55 tank. In combat, Bradley uses a 25-mm cannon and a 7.62-mm machine gun, as well as very powerful guided armor-piercing TOW rockets. These rockets can destroy M-84 tanks without any problems, regardless of which part of the tank they hit. Their maximum range is 3,750 meters. Along with the three-member crew, a Bradley can carry six troops.

Offensive Weapons

The Muslim army in Bosnia-Herzegovina will also be getting modern artillery, such as the self-propelled 155-mm howitzer the M109, which will significantly improve fire support capability for advancing troops. Of course, it is still unclear whether all these weapons really will come to Bosnia or the announced shipment is only one more form of political pressure on the Bosnian Serbs, as well as the Bosnian Croats. Because, regardless of all the successes in the implementation of the Dayton agreements, the overall political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is essentially no better than six months ago. Therefore, it is even more questionable if supplying any of the sides with weapons in the present situation is the correct thing to do. In line with such development, would it not be politically more thoughtful to reduce the quantity of weaponry, rather than increasing it? After all, the announcement of what is effectively the unilateral arming of only the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, accompanied by statements that the HVO already has enough weapons, will not actually help "the implementation of the Federation" because the Federation partner could easily be tempted to use its new arms to achieve the long proclaimed goals of gaining access to the sea, which would put a final end not only to the Federation, but also to peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Croatia: Hadzic, OSCE Ambassador Discuss Human Rights

AU2006100096 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 18 Jun 96

[Unattributed report]

[FBIS Translated Text] We will monitor the human rights situation and the observance of rights of minorities in the district and all of Croatia, but our activity will peak after the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia] mandate, stated OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] Ambassador (Alberto Neu) today in Erdut. After meeting with Goran Hadzic, president of the Serb district of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, (Neu) underlined that the OSCE intends to open offices in Knin, Zagreb, and Vukovar to monitor the human rights situation. The Vukovar office will be opened later due to technical reasons. I discussed that with the representative of the Croatian government in Knin, with Mr. Vrkic in Osijek, and this morning with Mr. Klein in Vukovar, said (Neu).

In response to a question about the human rights situation in Croatia, the OSCE ambassador said he did not quite form the full picture yet, but emphasized that he concurs with the opinion of the Council of Europe regarding the admittance of Croatia to that institution. The Council of Europe is in a better position to make a correct decision and form an opinion on the human rights situation in Croatia, he said. (Alberto Neu) is Dutch ambassador to Argentina and, as he said, he is not ready to give his own comments and opinion about the situation, which he has yet to grasp.

Croatia: Talks in Progress on Djeletovci Oil Fields

AU2006105696 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 19 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Article from Djeletovci by Mirko Sajler and Zeljko Buksa: "'Scorpions' Chased Away, INA Arrives in Djeletovci?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Members of the Jordanian UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia] battalion have combed through the oil field area near Djeletovci, and chased away the remaining Arkan [Zeljko Raznatovic] "Scorpions," who had been making that area insecure with their gunfire, having tried to make reconstruction of the damaged facilities and the organization of oil exploitation impossible for the experts from INA [Croatian oil company]. However, the "Scorpions" paramilitary unit has mined a number of oil wells, so that they are not accessible until the UNTAES engineers from Slovakia remove the charges and make the zone safe again.

Soon the INA experts will be allowed to come to each of the 72 oil wells within the triangle between the villages of Djeletovci, Ilaca, and Privlaka. At the moment, only the so-called district government and its "prime minister" Vojislav Stanimirovic are opposed to their coming. The self-styled Serb leaders do not want to lose Djeletovci because the whole system of their "state" is based on income from oil. Since UNTAES has put a stop to the exploitation of oil from Djeletovci, the "state officials," who include "the local police," have not received their salaries for three months now.

Vojislav Stanimirovic has said: "We have lost 6 million German marks over the last two months since UNTAES made the exploitation of oil in Djeletovci impossible. So, it is the UN's fault that our district treasury is empty. The Croatian experts say that they cannot provide for the exploitation of oil in the next three months, but our experts would be able to do it within a couple of days. That shows that Croatia is not as interested in Djeletovci as we are because for us oil means life."

However, Jacques Klein's deputy, Derek Boodby, has openly told the Serb representatives: "INA, that is, Croatia, will bring the Djeletovci story to an end. You must negotiate with them about the supply of petroleum products for this area, which is under the Transitional Administration."

Mirko Tankosic, deputy head of the Office of the Government of the Republic of Croatia, has announced, during the transitional period, new talks between INA and the Serb representatives in the occupied Croatian Podunavlje [the Danube River basin] which will begin in the next days. On that occasion, Tankosic said for VJESNIK: "We will agree to no blackmail. INA must regain possession of Djeletovci. Nothing else is acceptable. If they really thought that they would get what they asked for, they would not devastate oil wells so ruthlessly."

What are the representatives of the Serb "district government" asking for? When they realized that they couldn't have possession of Djeletovci any longer, they proposed a new deal. They are offering INA a partnership on the principle: We give you crude oil, you give us petroleum products. More specifically, in his recent interview for Belgrade DUGA, Stanimirovic said that they wanted to keep the "Krajina Oil Company" as a company that would exploit oil and ship it to Pancevo, while control over the whole business would be taken over by UNTAES. "If this cannot be realized, we will agree that Mr Klein directs the oil toward Sisak, or somewhere else, provided we get a percentage of rent and petroleum products. The negotiations are moving in that direction, and I think that it will end that way. We would have our local company, and we do not need the pumps, because we have our own, overhauled ones," Stanimirovic said in that interview. So, the Serb leaders have once again come up with "a system" by which they would fill their "district budget."

"That is out of question. If we agreed to that, it would mean that we agreed to some kind of Serb autonomy in the Croatian Podunavlje," Mirko Tankosic says.

What proposal will the next INA delegation come to the occupied Croatian Podunavlje with? They will ask for the balance of their petroleum products needs. A regular supply could begin as soon as INA gains possession of the Djeletovci oil field. Simultaneously, INA promises that it will employ all the workers who have worked at the oil wells, measuring station, and gas stations during the occupation, and that it will pay two monthly salaries to the workers in advance.

Now, it is the Serbs' turn to decide: will they agree to INA's proposal, which grants them a regular supply of petroleum products during the time of the Transitional Administration? And after the peaceful reintegration is finished, the petroleum products supply will be the same as in all other parts of Croatia.

While on the one hand they are still searching for a solution to take over Djeletovci, according to information from INA, the part of the Economic Agreement on the exchange of artificial fertilizers for wheat and corn has been implemented in a much better way by the Serb side. We have found out from INA that this week the last shipments of the artificial fertilizers from Croatia's state reserves should be sent to the still occupied areas of the Croatian Podunavlje.

From INA Petrokemija [Petrochemical Industry] Kutina, 150 metric tons of two kinds of fertilizers, KAN and urea, are being shipped to that part of Croatia on a daily basis. Fertilizer is being transported from Kutina to Bilje and Milkovci, and then, escorted by the members of UNTAES, into the temporary occupied territory. It is estimated that a total of 2,800 metric tons of KAN, and 2,500 metric tons of urea will be shipped to the temporarily occupied region. In return, the Serbs from that area should send us wheat and corn from last year's and this year's crop, which, in the recent cited interview for Belgrade DUGA, was also promised by Vojislav Stanimirovic.

True, he cited as the main reason for such an exchange with the free part of Croatia, the lack of fertilizers in Serbia, and it was Serbia with which they have made a deal to get the supplies of fertilizers. "We must go for the solution that grants survival," Stanimirovic concluded. Does that mean that he, too, finally, has started to realize that "force will not ask a favor from God?"

Croatia: Author Says Karadzic Might Suffer 'Sudden' Death

AU1906123896 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 19 Jun 96 p 4

[Article by Josip Vricko: "Karadzic—Framed in Black"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Has the time come, and this is the impression one gains after reading some of the Serb papers close to the Pale leaders, for a (black) line to be drawn under the name of Radovan Karadzic. According to unofficial sources, some of "Slobo's people" are working to wrap up the life of this Montenegrin with his characteristic hairdo now that it has been concluded in Dedinje that "Radovan the Vain" is definitely lost and can no longer be brought back to the shining path of Slobodan Milosevic. True enough, according to reports by USIA, the U.S. foreign political institution, the president of "the Serb Republic" (recently united with the Pale Iron Lady, Biljana Plavsic) still enjoys vast support among the Serb people—as much as 70 percent. It is precisely these people, however, who are increasingly frequently (and fiercely) being served reports about Karadzic as the loser in this war.

The psychiatrist from Savnica went to war (in principle against Bosnia) with the slogan: "The Muslims cannot f... Yugoslavia with Bosnia remaining a virgin." He has lived to see the Serbs paraphrasing this (more or less) drunken joke into: "You cannot lose Sarajevo and stay alive!" The Bosnian Serbs believe—it seems they have reason to—that Karadzic has definitely lost Sarajevo. It has been abandoned by the best of Serbs (the same unfortunately also applies to the Bosniaks and the Croats, too) into whose houses have moved the Bosniak small town bumpkins from eastern Bosnia—the ones expelled by Karadzic's army. What the "Serb Republic" president called "the humane resettlement" did not quite succeed. The increasingly loud stories about Karadzic the loser, although half of Bosnia is nevertheless his, are in reality a preparation for "any eventuality" that might "suddenly" befall Karadzic's perennially (poetically) tousled head.

Milosevic, whose henchman Marko Nicovic Baron is in charge of this job, is working on the Serbs so that news of Karadzic having a sudden heart attack would not hurt them too badly. The possibility of suicide, since it runs in the Karadzic as well as the Milosevic family, would work in public regardless of the fact that Baron, for example, would pull the safety catch. The only question remains: Does Milosevic need Karadzic the Saint (according to some Serbian speculation, in the latter case Radovan would definitely become a saint)? The answer is: He needs him dead!

The leader of the Bosnian Serbs could actually prove to be a very dangerous witness, although he is sought as the suspected war criminal in the Hague. Of course, Milosevic is not exactly in the mood to listen to everything that he has done since Gazimestan until the present day. If Karadzic appears before the international tribunal (in this or another way), he will not spare anyone—that is for sure. He would definitely turn into a mockingbird. Finally, what would he stand to lose in such a case?! He has lost practically everything already and, as a Serbian weekly (reportedly close to Karadzic) writes, he is currently one of the most isolated and most sought after Serbs. All he is left with is his life. There are few at the moment, however, who would place their bets on the "president" who last year, in defiance of the entire world, was tying up NATO soldiers.

Croatia: Article Traces Changes in Public Information Law

AU1906115196 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 11 Jun 96 p 5

[Article by M. Jurasic: "Kuna for Reputation and Honor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The days of the Public Information Law are numbered after slightly more than four years of its application. Its validity expires on 30 June, as determined by the Constitutional Court six months ago. The Law was revoked on the grounds of formal discrepancy with the Constitution. The majority of all members of the House of Representatives (not the majority of present representatives, which was how the revocation came to be) need a new bible for journalists to become valid on 30 June. The bill of the new Law was accepted in the first parliamentary reading last week.

The mitigating circumstance in the parliamentary quandary is that the Croatian Journalists' Association [HND] has withdrawn their suggestion of the Law. The explanation given by their Executive Board is that the Justice Ministry has accepted most of their suggestions, and the government is ready to make compromises after certain objections were made about the text of the proposed Law. The suggestion of the government is based on the revoked Public Information Law, as the constitutionality of its contents was not disputed. The HND agreed that the existing Law should not undergo substantial changes, but revisions and amendments should be provided where proven necessary in previous application. We will extract new portions from the proposed text of the new Law.

Obtaining Information

Besides information obtained illegally (by means of bugging devices, hidden cameras, theft...), the publication of which was also prohibited by the previous Law, the consequence of alterations in the Penal Code is that the prohibition specifically applies to state secrets, too.

An authorized person, as before, is obliged to provide information for journalists within a reasonable time, except about what is legally defined as a state secret, and a new clause is that they must justify their refusal to give information. The illegal refusal to give information has already been punishable, but only by a fine of 150 to 250 kuna, while the suggested fines range from 5,000 to 20,000 kuna. The same fine is suggested for publishers who do not fulfill their obligations as well as for editors in chief who violate regulations about publishing corrections.

The alternative to the present "possibility" of defining internal relations within editorial staffs is an "obligatory" statute, with two suggested procedures for adoption.

The Council for Protection of Public Information Freedom has actually not worked so far, but the government has nevertheless planned to retain the body. The alteration is that the previous representative of the Croatian Board of Trade is replaced by a representative of the Association of Newspaper Publishers.

Money for Fear

The most substantial changes are in the field of regulations about responsibility for damage, as expected. The present solution is to be supplemented by a regulation that defines compensation for consequential damage by apology, the correction of incorrect information, and paying a "rightful compensation in money for inflicted pain and fear, should the duration and intensity of pain and fear justify that." Accordingly, judges could adjust the verdict to each individual case, and it would not always end up with a compensation of 50,000 to 70,000 kuna. For instance, a verdict could be that a publisher must pay one kuna to the politician whom he had insulted and publish the verdict.

The bill retains the five previously defined cases in which the publisher does not have to pay for the damage, and new cases have been added. Reports from sessions of public authorities' bodies and from public meetings now have the same status. As the treatment has been different so far, publishers were sued (and punished) to pay compensation for publishing statements that politicians made in press conferences and meetings that were not "sessions of public authorities." As legal terms often have different interpretations in court, all events that can be considered public meetings should be defined by examples or descriptions. The same goes for the term "public activities of the damaged party."

Authorization of Interviews

The draft of the new Law says precisely, for instance, that the authorization of an interview is an oral or written approval of publication. However, the term "interview" is not substituted by "statement," although that is what most conflicts are about, even if the disputed information is published in the form of an interview. However, an interview can also be published in indirect speech, as a report on an interview, without answers and questions indicated. In such cases, judges consider the form important and do not treat such statements as authorized interviews, although the author gave permission for publication. In that case, journalists who write columns on local events would be at a loss.

The publisher is considered not responsible if a photograph of the damaged party was published with the knowledge and permission of the damaged party, provided that the "damaged party had not restricted the right to use the photograph to the author of the photograph." That regulation applies to entertainers and celebrities.

Insurance Against Responsibility

A great novelty is the obligatory "insurance against responsibility for damage inflicted by published information," devised after the model of similar solutions for lawyers and town clerks. Newspaper publishers will have 30 days to sign the contract on insurance after the future Law becomes valid. If a publisher does not start the procedure of contracting, he will be considered to have stopped publishing newspapers. The authorized body will issue a decree on that, and the publisher can institute legal proceedings against that decree.

[Box, p 5]

"Justifiable Interest of the Public"

It is important that the new Law contains the clause that publisher is not responsible for damage "if the published information is true, and there was a justifiable interest of the public for that information." That regulation was included in the 1992 bill, but was rejected by members of parliament during the legislative procedure, with the explanation that the term "justifiable interest of the public" is too imprecise. That regulation would enable journalists to write about anonymous citizens, should the public be justifiably interested in their criminal acts, for instance. The bill does not contain that regulation, but the commentary of the bill does, and we hope that it was omitted in the bill by mistake.

[Box, p 5]

Charges of Those Who Take Offense With Delay

Another novelty is that legal proceedings for compensation of damage can be instituted within six months at latest after the information in question was published. In one present process, charges were pressed 16 months after the disputed information was published. In the future, all those who are apt to take offense with delay might see their legal proceedings rejected, because the suggested regulations might be valid for all processes in which verdicts are not reached before the new Law becomes valid—and most of the present processes are of that kind.

As to the presently valid regulation about urgent procedure in media processes for compensation of damage, two solutions are suggested. According to the first, new facts and evidence can be included in the plaintiff's statement only if the prosecutor proves that they have been unable to do so—not by their own fault—before the main hearing. The second alternative also regulates dates of summons: The first date of summons must be eight days after the arraignment at latest, and the court of second instance must decide within 30 days after the arraignment.

[Box, p 5]

Superfluous on Editor in Chief

Two of the new regulations about the editor in chief in the government's bill are actually superfluous. It is suggested that the publisher appoint and dismiss editors in chief "considering the opinion of the majority of journalists." The opinion would not be obligatory for the publisher, so there is no point in asking for it. If the intention was to enable journalists to decide on the appointments and dismissals of editors in chief, the regulation should have been formulated that way.

Furthermore, editors in chief should be responsible for all information published, so the addition that it also applies to edited information (choice of headlines, subheads, text under photographs...) is unnecessary. The suggestion of a fine of 5,000 to 20,000 kuna for an editor in chief "if his editing, especially choice of headline, alters the meaning of information published in a public paper" will be severely criticized. That regulation will give every editor in chief the creeps. Will each and every alteration be punished—small or big, deliberate or accidental? Even if nobody is damaged? Who and what is protected by that?

FYROM: Gligorov Fears War in Bosnia If U.S. Troops Leave

AU1206171896 Paris AFP in English 1701 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, June 12 (AFP)—Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov expressed concern Wednesday that war would break out again in Bosnia-Herzegovina if U.S. troops pulled out at the end of the year.

Gligorov raised that concern with U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry who was in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] for a short visit to dedicate a military training center here.

He said there was a "real danger" that the NATO-led mission in Bosnia would fail and renewed fighting would break out without the Implementation Force being able to keep peace.

"I have often expressed my concern that the tasks Bosnia faces right now are too great to be fulfilled in just a couple of short months," Gligorov said in an interview with reporters travelling with Perry.

Gligorov emphasized the importance of maintaining U.S. troops in the NATO-led peace force, noting that the peace process in Bosnia had only been a success because Washington came in with a large contingent of troops.

Perry, on the first stop of a five-day European tour, met with the Macedonian leader and delivered a speech to parliament that called for cooperation through NATO's Partnership for Peace program and military transparency as keys to future stability and peace in the Balkans.

Earlier, as he flew to Macedonia, Perry told reporters U.S. ground troops should take part in a new NATO force next year if it is needed to prevent war from breaking out again in Bosnia.

In an emotion-charged ceremony, Perry dedicated a training center at a Macedonian military academy in Skopje in memory of Joseph Kruzel, the defense department official who dreamed up the Partnership for Peace concept.

Kruzel was killed last year along with State Department official Robert Frasure in an accident on a mountain road in Bosnia while trying to negotiate peace.

His widow, Gail, and young son John listened as Kruzel was praised as a humanitarian and peacemaker.

Macedonia is the 27th member of the Partnership for Peace program, and Perry's third visit here was aimed at encouraging that process and at reaffirming the U.S. military relationship with Macedonia's 20,0000-strong army.

The Macedonian parliament recently extended the mandate of a UN peacekpeeing mission, which includes 556 U.S. troops and has been in operation since 1992 to prevent ethnic unrest in other former Yugoslav republics from spilling over into Macedonia.

Perry had lunch and met with U.S. peacekeepers at Camp Able Sentry before flying to Brussels for a meeting Thursday of NATO defense ministers.

FYROM: Gligorov Views Local, European Cooperation

AU1906152696 Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jun 96 pp 16-19

[Interview with Kiro Gligorov, president of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, by Nenad Lj. Stefanovic; place and date not given: "Outside the Balkan Basket"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The interview with the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] president was conducted immediately after the announcement in Skopje that the Macedonian president's personal friend, Dr. Slavko Milosavlevski, was about to become the first Macedonian ambassador to the FRY. After agreeing that it was not necessary to wait so long for normalizating relations between the FRY and Macedonia, a question was asked regarding the resolution of the continuing discord over the issue of succession.

[Gligorov] The agreement on normalizing relations is really unnecessarily overdue, particularly because among us there are not, nor have there been, any misunderstandings that would prevent us from working together and understanding each other. It is really important that in this agreement the FRY has recognized the continuity of the Macedonian state as of 1944 and that Macedonia has been recognized by its constitutional name. This is important for us. If it were not so, it would really be an exception because all the former Yugoslav republics have recognized us by our constitutional name. So it would be odd not to be so recognized by a country that is our neighbor and with which we will necessarily need to cooperate in our common future. Now, of course, we need to buy time. We need to do all the work that stems from the agreement on normalizing of relations as soon as possible, most importantly the issue of succession. If we do not resolve this question it will repeatedly burden our relations and cause occasional strife.

As far as I can see, the view of the FRY is to insist upon the fact that Yugoslavia is the only successor of the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. To me this does not seem like a realistic position taking into consideration all internationally significant decisions. Even the Badinter Commission, no matter how different people may regard it, had adopted the decision that Yugoslavia had fallen apart and that the states that subsequently were created on its territory, were the successor states of the former Yugoslavia. This is not being disputed, and we also said that in the Belgrade agreement, that Yugoslavia in the form of Serbia and in some other forms, had existed earlier. In fact it was one of the first Balkan states. We do not dispute this continuity. We only want it to be said that the SFRY was a composite state made up of sides that had taken part in the war. We had a joint supreme command, but each republic was largely independent in acting on its own territory, because the circumstances had been quite different. The whole story as to how the SFRY had been created and why the various republics voluntarily joined together is basically the result of our common assessment that it was necessary to fight against fascism. It would not be proper for only one nation to get all the credit for the fruits of that common struggle. This is primarily what each of the nations owes to the army that was created here and fought against the Germans all the way up to the Austrian border. Twenty-four thousand people from this area had given their lives in that war. This was, at the same time, one of the main reasons we did not want to be involved in this war because we stand to gain nothing and could lose very much.

[Stefanovic] So you feel that the issue of succession can be resolved very quickly.

[Gligorov] Even the JNA [Yugoslav Peoples Army] withdrew from here voluntarily, following a signed agreement, and there was no mutual fighting and no casualties. These are circumstances which undoubtedly indicate that in some other situation two such nations, two such states, would immediately attempt to resolve the problem of succession in the simplest possible way. I know that in Serbia there are also political forces which think differently, and that is why I greatly esteem the gesture made by the FRY in accepting the name of Macedonia and the continuity of our statehood. Others may want their continuity acknowledged from as far back as 1918, or even earlier, but ours was a very practical point of view. As a result of the Balkan wars and World War I, Macedonia had been divided among its neighbors and in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia we were looked upon as southern Serbs, with no national identity of our own, no autonomy, no recognition of our language. We do not consider any of that as continuity that we really care about. But the continuity that came about as the result of the creation of the Republic of Macedonia as a state and its joining into the Yugoslav federation along with the other republics, we do consider as being mutual and therefore we feel that this particular part of our statehood should be respected.

[Stefanovic] You vehemently oppose the idea of pushing Macedonia back into some new kind of "Balkan basket" and you support the thesis "Europeanization—yes, regionalization—no." But it seems that it is the EU that is increasingly opting for regionalization.

[Gligorov] We thought that this question had been transcended, simply because we are generally in favor of every kind of regional cooperation. This is not an issue. But when in our draft agreement with the EU there first appeared a clause and obligation on regional connection, we sought an explanation. Such a problem had not arisen in any of the earlier agreements with the EU. So why now? Let us say this is not so crucial. More importantly, is this a political decision of the EU and will it be the practice in all ensuing agreements with the states of the former Yugoslavia and all the Balkan countries? This is what is important for us. Regional cooperation as a general idea is not a problem. We immediately offered open borders and free movement of people and goods to all our neighbors, and in that respect we have no hesitation. We wish to cooperate with all our neighbors to the greatest possible extent. But just which regional association we will join must remain each country's independent decision. Any a priori views regarding mutual cooperation among the states of the former Yugoslavia, or Balkan states, which is now being reformulated as "southeastern Europe" are not good. What we have there are issues that have not been sufficiently cleared up.

We are interested, for instance, in cooperation within the Central European initiative. We would also like to be a member of Central European regional cooperation, because this is the wider environment that interests us. We would also very gladly cooperate within the Black Sea initiative. We are also prepared to talk about some wider regional cooperation among the states of the former Yugoslavia, but this must remain something that we will decide about ourselves lest we enter some combinations not under our control and where some other aims may possibly be had in mind, the more so since in my opinion the aim of each of the Balkan states should be to one day become a part of European integration. I do not agree with the notions that the Balkans should first be kept as a kind of ghetto, make them civilized, and then see what to do with them. That could cost Europe dearly, which was plain to see in the example of Bosnia. Now we have a situation where 60,000 soldiers have to keep the peace there.

[Stefanovic] Macedonia has recently become a member of the Partnership for Peace. To what extent does the presence of American soldiers on the territory of your country bring self-confidence to Macedonia?

[Gligorov] Their presence in numbers is indeed symbolic. This cannot be a military guarantee for the safety of the country. But their presence does have a certain, not at all slight, significance. Those UN peace forces on the borders with Serbia and Albania have managed to function efficiently in a number of incidents which are now in the past. For instance, they had gone without any hesitation to the General Staff in Belgrade and told them that this could not go on. They had taken maps issued by that very same General Staff and explained that it was territory which belonged to Macedonia. But all right, that border is not quite properly designated and one could not be sure about every single square meter to the left or to the right. Nevertheless, the incidents had been a cause for concern. In Belgrade they met with General Perisic and cleared up the issue of what it would mean to open new conflicts toward the south, and also in the vicinity of Kosovo. And after that there were no more border problems.

Macedonia is definitely set on joining the EU when that becomes possible and also wants to become a member of NATO.

[Stefanovic] Is the Greco-Macedonian dispute close to some compromise solution, and how far is Macedonia prepared to go in these compromises?

[Gligorov] We have shown willingness to cooperate and understand the other side, because there is always a part of the truth on the other side, and to try to find some way out which would not jeopardize the identity of this nation and the name of this state, because in that case we would be opening Pandora's box in the Balkans. We would again have all the old conflicts which in some countries still exist regarding the fact that we are actually another state but the same people, with the same history and roots. We essentially know where that leads—as in all similar situations two states of the same people would ultimately have to join into one. Tomorrow that could then happen with Serbia, at least with some forces there. [passage omitted] Because of such a situation we simply must be concerned about preserving our identity, language, and history. That is something we cannot lose from sight because it involves the foundations of the independence of this state. Changing its name would create a great psychological and ethical problem with our citizens—people would wonder what this was, who we were. A few years ago we conducted a referendum in which the population clearly voted in favor of their own state. About 98 percent of the people responded in that way. This can hardly be disregarded. It seems to me that a repeated referendum would show even more drastic results, if there can be anything more drastic than 98 percent.

Personally I do not believe there is a single individual involved in politics, either in the ruling party or the opposition, who would agree to a change of name for Macedonia. This does not mean that we do not want and are not prepared to conduct further talks about this issue and present historical and other arguments showing clearly that we are a separate nation. [passage omitted]

[Stefanovic] From the very beginning your policy has rested on four basic pillars—a western orientation, an equidistance toward our neighbors, a patient and tolerant resolving of international problems, and a reform-oriented course in politics and economy. There are indications that in the meantime the international pillar is seriously wobbling.

[Gligorov] In these last five years there has been a long-standing thesis about some kind of ethnic unity according to which all those who are the same nationality must have the same way of thinking and must express their unified views. In the meantime the pluralistic development of Macedonia has resulted in the fact that in all segments of the population, regardless of religious or ethnic affiliation, different parties have been created. This has also happened with the Albanians. Therefore, time has shown that all people of the same ethnic group cannot think the same. This is the great delusion of nationalism that under one single slogan it will unite an entire nation in an effort to carry out some great ideal of unification, create some great, ethnically pure state. Personally I am convinced that the great majority of the Albanian people in Macedonia feel this is their country and if they could choose between living here and in Albania—they would live here. But at the same time we emphasize that there is a red line over which we will never cross, and that is we will never allow the creation of any kind of autonomy, Illyrida, or possible secession. We do want to discuss all these other issues and we say loudly and clearly what is possible, and what is not, by the law and by the Constitution.

[Stefanovic] The breakup of the coalition of the Alliance for Macedonia is considered so far to be the most serious blow to your policy. Do you agree that the fall of this coalition which you supported during the elections is some kind of political assassination on you personally?

[Gligorov] There are several critical remarks made regarding my views on the liberals abandoning the coalition. There was talk that I as president should not interfere, that these were party affairs. I was advised just to look on and not interfere in this dispute because as president I would be forfeiting the confidence of all the citizens of Macedonia. My own opinion was just the opposite. I assessed the breakup as an event which had possible negative consequences. I did not, for instance, fear that without the liberals the government could not function. Even without the liberals the government in the assembly has a two-thirds majority. I did fear that in the next parliamentary elections some of the voters might feel they had been cheated. That they had been presented a program by a certain political structure which had promised them the coalition would last long, introduce reforms and lead the country into the EU and NATO. An now, all at once, a year or so after the elections, one of the partners is leaving the coalition. To be honest, the liberals feel they have not abandoned the coalition but had been expelled from it. [passage omitted]

Personally, however, I do not think that the breakup of the coalition is a political attack against me. I see no defeat in this, although there are different opinions. I work well with the prime minister and the individual ministers and in that respect there are no problems at all.

[Box, p 18]

Borders

I am convinced that in 10 or 15 years, no longer than that, many of the countries that were created from the former Yugoslavia will be either associate or regular members of the EU. That will be a gradual process and it will become obvious how aimless it was to die for borders, territories, and ethnically pure states in such a complex Balkan region where no one can draw a line as to what belongs to whom and who should live there. Let everyone live wherever they want, which is exactly the idea of Schengen.

Why did so many people have to die anyway when even during the breakup of Yugoslavia the Schengen Europe had begun to emerge, with open borders and free circulation of people and ideas?

FYROM: Frcovski To Attend Balkan Foreign Ministers Meeting

AU2006101696 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The independent A-1 television channel in Skopje, citing diplomatic sources in Skopje, reports that Ljubomir Frckovski, minister of foreign affairs of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], will take part in the meeting of the Balkan foreign ministers rescheduled for 6 to 7 July in Sofia. Our correspondent in Skopje, Gospodin Filipov, reports:

[Begin recording] Reporting on the rescheduling of the Sofia meeting, the A-1 television channel said that during the meeting, despite everything, in front of the Macedonian foreign minister will be a name plate that will not bear the name FYROM.

For two days the Macedonian mass media have reported that official invitations to participate have been sent to all Balkan foreign ministers. The fact that the new dates were personally agreed upon by Bulgarian Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski and his colleagues during the Florence meeting on Bosnia-Herzegovina is pointed out as a serious guarantee for really holding the meeting. Simultaneously, the mass media mention the reservations Macedonia had over the previous dates of the forum and especially over the manner in which the Bulgarian organizers intended to treat the Skopje delegation.

The problem of the name under which Macedonia appears in international forums and in contacts with other partners was especially exacerbated in the last two days. The reason—the demand of the EU Commission that the already prepared treaty on cooperation and trade with Macedonia be signed under the name FYROM. The reaction to this in Skopje is very sharp. It is directed predominantly toward Greece, which is being accused of deceiving the other EU partners and of being the most serious obstacle to the signing of the document.

The Macedonian delegation has proposed several ways to overcome the problem, and some of them could be used during the Sofia meeting. [end recording]

FYROM: Proving Ground Offered for NATO Exercises

AU1906160596 Skopje MIC in English 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] has offered the largest proving ground in the Balkans "Krivolak" (Central Macedonia) for NATO and Partnership for Peace exercises. Macedonia already has a special unit made up of 220 soldiers for rapid peace interventions as part of Partnership for Peace.

Macedonia's Defense Minister Blagoj Handziski stated Tuesday evening in the interview for the private A1 TV that "Macedonia has offered Krivolak for NATO's military exercises for rapid interventions in conditions of natural catastrophe."

Krivolak used to be used by the former Yugoslav National Army for all kinds of military exercises and arms testing. The public in Macedonia and some neighboring countries speculates that Krivolak will either be turned into a NATO or American base.

Handziski denied these rumors, explaining that this fall, Krivolak will be the location for military exercises of some NATO and Partnership for Peace member-states in natural catastrophe conditions. "Krivolak can only be a proving ground, and not a base. Base, the way it is perceived in the country, is an obsolete term," he said.

"Macedonia has already trained a unit of 220 soldiers for peacekeeping activities," said Handziski, "however, these troops will not be sent to Bosnia as part of IFOR [Implementation Force]. They will be used for rapid interventions in conditions of natural catastrophe."

Macedonia was accepted to NATO's Partnership for Peace program in November, 1995. The UN preventive peacekeeping mission was deployed in Macedonia in 1993. Today, the UNPREDEP [UN Preventive Deployment Force] mission in Macedonia numbers 1,100 soldiers made up of one U.S. battalion of 550 soldiers and one Scandinavian battalion of 550 soldiers.

The Macedonian government, as officially reported last month, insists that this mission stays on at least until the implementation of the Dayton Accord is finalized and until the Kosovo question is settled in a way that would present a threat to the peace in the region.

FYROM: Agreement With EU Uncertain

AU1906155996 Skopje MIC in English 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Euro-Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] negotiations which officially started in Brussels yesterday morning, were broken off in the afternoon, and the signing of the Agreement on cooperation between Macedonia and the EU has been postponed, MAKPRESS reports, quoting negotiating circles in Brussels. The same sources claim that the leader of the Macedonian negotiating team, the Vice-President of the government Yane Miljovski, broke off the negotiations because he was given the condition that the Agreement be signed between the EU and FYROM, and not as it was previously agreed, to use the formulation "between the two contracting parties."

In the meantime, an urgent session of the European Commission was convened, which reviewed this problem. The representative of the European Commission stated that this is the last chance to reach an agreement for signing the Agreement, and emphasized: "If this is not achieved, the mandate for negotiations will have to be returned to the Council of ministers."

The Macedonian refusal to accept the conditions imposed by the EU would cause the signing the Agreement to be postponed a couple of months. This would lead to a new mandate which would explicitly insist on a new approach, diplomatic sources in Brussels say.

FYROM: Albanian Politician Sends Open Letter to Gligorov

AU1906160896 Skopje MIC in English 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The President of the Democratic Forum for Human Rights and Freedoms from Gostivar, Milaim Fejziu, and member of the Senate of the illegal university in Albanian language in Tetovo, published an open letter to President Kiro Gligorov in the daily newspaper in Albanian language FLAKE E VELLAZERIMIT on the 15th of this month.

Among the rest, the open letter says that the "pan-Slav concept for integration of the Albanians in the Slav Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] society has no scientific basis, due to which it cannot be practically realized. You know that the Albanians have nothing particular in common with the Slav Macedonians. The national values of the Albanians have no connection with the Slav Macedonian, neither the language, history, cultural heritage, tradition, nor all other national characteristics for us to accept the Slav Macedonian values, that is to assimilate. What do the Slav Macedonians have more than the other nations in order to have the right to rule them!?," Fejziu writes.

In the long letter, among the rest, Fejziu says that "the anti-human, chauvinistic and antidemocratic policy towards the Albanians results with the establishment of the Tetovo University as a single Albanian institution. It aims to preserve the national identity and culture of the Albanians."

Fejziu insists that Macedonia legalizes the existence of the Tetovo University. Any prolongation of this problem will have a detrimental effect on the future of the state. "Then, it will be too late to save the 'oasis of peace,' which, without a doubt, will be turned into an 'oasis' of inter-ethnic conflict, and you personally will bear responsibility for that," Fejziu tells President Gligorov in his open letter.

Poland: Daily Reports on Postelection Scene in Russia

WS1906130896

[FBIS Report] On 19 June, Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish, a major center-left daily, carries two commentaries on the postelection scene in Russia.

On page two is a 350-word commentary by GAZETA WYBORCZA journalist Pawel Lawinski entitled "The Lebed Card." "Yeltsin is clearly opportunistic in taking Lebed on board," writes Lawinski. "It is not the general himself who is so precious but the 15 percent of voters who will decide who gets the keys to the Kremlin after the second round of elections," he says. The commentary notes that in Poland "such a move would elicit shouts from the people: This is blatant bribery, clutching at straws! Such an ostentatious attempt at securing more votes would do the presidential candidate more harm than good. But not in Russia." Lawinski goes on to conclude: "The people voted for Lebed because they wanted a strong man who would reinstate law and order and put an end to corruption. Lebed is now in a position where he can fulfill his promises. They voted against the state authorities. But now Lebed is a state authority, too. They voted for a charismatic leader. Before the second round, he will become even more charismatic by taking steps such as yesterday's disclosure of an 'antipresidential coup.' They voted so that Lebed could rule. He will, if Yeltsin wins; that is, unless Yeltsin gets rid of him after the elections. But that may happen only after the elections."

On page six is a 500-word commentary by well-known political commentator Leopold Unger entitled "Storms Ahead." The author states that, along with Lebed, "a new generation of leaders from beyond the court of the post-Brezhnev cabal are entering the Kremlin." He goes on to point out that, "just hours after his appointment, the new security chief disclosed plans of a coup that was to be staged by Grachev's men, announced a purge within the Security Council, and let it be known that he intends to share responsibility for order in the state with no one—the 'no one' being General Korzhakov, Yeltsin's closest aide. Storms lie ahead. We now have to see where the wind is blowing from." Unger writes that "today, whoever aims for power in Russia promising 'less crime, less bribery, and lower taxes' is making promises that border on the verge of the surreal."

Poland: NATO Workshop Begins in Warsaw

WS1906145296 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 19 Jun 96 p 2

[Untitled report by Adam Stasinski]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Deputy Defense Minister] Dr. Andrzej Karkoszka: The NATO Workshop is undoubtedly a large undertaking of major importance on the international scale. It provides us with an opportunity to present our achievements to the highest ranking military experts and politicians from West Europe, countries cooperating with the alliance within the framework of the Partnership for Peace program, as well as NATO leaders. To use military language, one might say this is an "artillery preparation" of sorts for the next few months to come, during which many states will adopt a stance on admitting us as a member. This year's workshop is an immense promotion of NATO in Poland. It is true that by now we are well aware of all of the problems that joining the alliance entails—with all its technical, economic and international aspects. However, talks on our future membership, on the privileges and responsibilities it involves, the influence it will have on the internal life of our country, its economy and its policies, are needed on a daily basis.

I believe it is no coincidence that Poland was chosen to host the NATO conference. I wish to point out that we were the first organizers of international exercises within the Partnership for Peace program. We were the first to suggest a framework document and the Individual Partnership Project, and the first to be discussed by the 16 plus 1 group. The fact that Warsaw was selected as the host city is a tribute to Polish foreign policy, which is highly acclaimed by statesmen at international meetings of various levels, scientific symposiums, and conferences. Our contribution to guaranteeing stability in our region, as well as our success in doing away with the remnants of the Cold War and building trust and European security, are often raised. The above examples allow one to presume that we are in the lead among states applying for NATO membership.

[NATO Workshop Chairman] Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon: We have invited heads of state, prime ministers, defense and foreign affairs ministers, high-ranking military experts, and representatives of industrial and scientific communities from more than 30 countries. Also present will be the political and military leadership of NATO, including Secretary General Javier Solana and General George Joulwan, commander in chief of the Allied Forces in Europe.

We do not intend to create a new security policy in the course of the meeting. We want participants to share their observations and opinions on current issues pertaining to European integration, regional security in the Baltic states and East and West Europe, and military cooperation in Bosnia. We trust that a dialogue on such a high level will mark a big step forward in cementing mutual trust and strengthening security in Europe at the turn of the 21st century.

I believe that we cannot avoid speaking about enlarging NATO to include new members or the restructuring and modernization of the alliance, topics we discussed at the recent summit of foreign ministers from the 16 NATO states in Berlin.

I wish to take the opportunity to cordially thank the Polish authorities for the invitation and for taking on the role of host of this year's workshop. Having spent several days in Warsaw, I can state that an immense organizational effort has been undertaken at a high level of professionalism. This further proves that we made the right choice by selecting Poland as the host country for the workshop. We made that choice on the basis of the achievements of Polish foreign policy in the field of security, stability, and strengthening peace.

Poland: Kwasniewski Addresses NATO Workshop in Warsaw

LD2006112296 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1005 GMT 20 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] President Aleksander Kwasniewski, during the opening of the 13th NATO workshop in Warsaw, has confirmed Poland's constant and unwavering aspiration to become a member of the pact. The president was addressing the conference participants at the Hotel Victoria, among whom were NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev.

[Kwasniewski, in English fading into Polish] I confirm Poland's consistent and unequivocal aspiration to become a full member of NATO as soon as possible. I am convinced that there is no longer a need to ask why we are trying to become a member.

President Kwasniewski said that Poland had already fulfilled the conditions that gave it the right to strive for NATO membership. Poland has made definite progress in preparing local structures along the road leading to membership. Our political system bears all of the hallmarks of a mature and stable democracy. Legal regulations have defined civilian control over the Army, and, at the moment, we are gaining practical experience in this sphere. I wish to assure you that by the time we join the alliance this matter will have definitely been settled. President Kwasniewski admitted that NATO was a key factor for stability in Europe, and the participation of a Polish battalion in the peace operation in Bosnia provided a concrete practical dimension to Polish aspirations to join NATO.

After this speech, debates that are closed to the press got under way. [passage omitted]

Poland: Western Diplomats Ruffled by MSZ Appointment

WS1906131396 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish 19 Jun 96 p 3

[Article by Wojciech Luczak: "PSL Representative at the MSZ Upsets Diplomats"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Embassies of several West European states have approached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ] via diplomatic channels asking what are they to make of reports that Janusz Borkowski, a 44-year-old deputy of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] from Siedlce, is to be appointed deputy foreign minister. He is to be responsible for integration with the EU.

Diplomats are hinting to MSZ officials that they find it difficult to understand how a representative of a party that openly protests Poland's pro-European policy can now shape it. The moment Borkowski takes over as deputy foreign minister, the office of the MSZ's "chief strategist" overseeing the process of joining NATO and the EU will be liquidated. Thus far, this function has been performed by Deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Towpik. When Borkowski assumes supervision of Poland's contacts with the EU, Towpik will deal with NATO issues. "Can you imagine what an impression this will make on the EU?" one of the Western diplomats asked outright.

MSZ Spokesman Pawel Dobrowolski told SZTANDAR that, as of yet, Deputy Jan Borkowski is not on the ministerial pay list.

Poland: Prime Minister, Estonian Counterpart Discuss Ties

LD1906192396 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1700 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Tiit Vahi met today Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz of the People's [as heard] Republic of Poland. The meeting discussed various aspects of the two countries' cooperation, closer trade and economic links, defense cooperation, the concluding of an agreement on legal assistance, the fight against crime, and cooperation in international organizations. Vahi and Cimoszewicz concluded that it would be expedient to conclude a free trade agreement between Estonia and Poland urgently. Estonia has already handed over a draft agreement to Poland, and a Polish response is expected shortly. Tiit Vahi also briefed the Polish prime minister on the principles of the Baltic states' free trade agreement signed on 16 June in Vilnius.

Defense cooperation opportunities between the two countries are first and foremost seen in training, and cooperation in this sphere with Lithuania is progressing well for Poland. The Polish prime minister thought that cooperation with Estonia could be arranged along the same lines.

Both prime ministers thought it would be important for the strengthening of links between countries to implement the Via Baltica [motorway linking Helsinki to Warsaw] project while substantially improving capacity at the border posts.

Vahi and Cimoszewicz acknowledged that development of Estonia and Poland in economy and foreign relations is taking place along similar lines. Both countries have achieved indicators in their development that make their prospects for joining the European Union good. The need to coordinate with each other any preparations for joining the EU was emphasized. First and foremost, it is certain indicators [as heard] in documents that need to be drawn up.

The prime ministers exchanged views on the outcome of the first round of the Russian presidential elections last Sunday. The Polish prime minister stated that the Polish minority living in Estonia is satisfied with the Estonian authorities' policy on the minorities.

Tiit Vahi presented an invitiation to the Polish prime minister to visit Estonia. The time of the visit will be set through diplomatic channels, but it may take place in the near future.

Poland: British Military Training Pact Signed

WS2006065996 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 19 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Ryszard Choroszy: "Agreement on British Military Training in Poland: A Higher Level of Cooperation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *On 18 June, National Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski and British Defense Secretary Michael Portillo signed an agreement on conducting exercises of British military units on Polish territory.*

This is the first agreement of this kind signed by Poland with a major NATO member state. It proceeds from an agreement between NATO and the states participating in the Partnership for Peace Program, signed by Poland on 3 November 1995, addressing the status of their armed forces.

In particular, political and military benefits emerging from the concluded agreement were emphasized. It has political benefits because it provides stable and strong support to Polish intentions to join NATO. Military benefits, however, result from the participation of Polish officers—as observers—in British military exercises on training grounds of the Polish Armed Forces. This will make it possible to directly familiarize them with methods of conducting operations by staffs of higher tactical units, as well as with the preparation, organization, and course of British military training. In the opinion of Colonel Francisk Gagor, Foreign Military Issues Department chief, these factors will bolster the compatibility of the Polish Armed Forces with the NATO Armed Forces.

The agreement comprises 15 articles and specifies principles of payment by the British Armed Forces for using the infrastructure of training grounds of the Polish Armed Forces. The agreement will go into effect only after it is ratified by both the Polish parliament and the president.

Minister Dobrzanski expressed hope that this will take place quite soon.

In September 1996, exercises will be held on the training ground in Drawsk, in which 3,500 servicemen from the Seventh Armored Brigade, equipped with hardware and tanks, will participate. They will be transported there primarily by sea and air.

The national defense minister did not conceal the fact that there were problems pertaining to coordinating certain specific issues, such as, for example, the status of the British staff that will stay on Polish territory during the military exercises, the administration of legal authority and police control, as well as organizing a special train network schedule, wearing uniforms, carrying arms and ammunition, providing medical services, and taking relevant measures if incidents and arguments occur. However, the "golden mean" was found. The agreement is almost identical to similar agreements concluded between NATO member states.

As POLSKA ZBROJNA has learned, for example, some tenets addressing claims are more beneficial for Poland. For example, Poland will be fully compensated—not just partially—for inflicted damage.

The agreement also comprises principles specifying the payment for both the use of the infrastructure of Polish training grounds and additional services rendered by the Polish side. There are unofficial rumors that Britain will pay some $100 daily for the stay of its serviceman. The money, however, will go to...the state budget.

The Army has an interest in modernizing the infrastructure of its training grounds. Thanks to modernization, it would be possible to create better conditions for training Polish servicemen and, according to a report by the National Defense Ministry spokesperson Eugeniusz Mleczak, for drafting a more profitable offer for other states that have an interest in training their units in Poland (for example, the Netherlands).

Local communities can also count on benefits emerging from the stay of foreign servicemen. Additional jobs to expand the infrastructure of the training grounds, and not only in Drawsk Pomorski, are at issue here.

Deputy National Defense Minister Andrzej Karkoszka participated in the official ceremony of signing the agreement.

Poland: Law on Duties of National Defense Minister

96EP0070A Warsaw DZIENNIK USTAW in Polish 30 Jan 96 No 10, pp 159-161

[Law dated 14 December 1995 detailing duties of the minister of national defense]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Article 1.1. The minister of national defense exercises overall control of national defense.

1.2. The minister of national defense exercises his duties with the aid of the Ministry of National Defense, hereinafter referred to as "the ministry," whose structure includes the General Staff of the Polish Army.

Article 2. The scope of activities of the minister of national defense includes:

1) Directing in peacetime the whole of the activities of the armed forces of the Polish Republic, hereinafter referred to as "the armed forces."

2) Drafting the premises of national defense, inclusive of proposals concerning the development and structure of the armed forces.

3) Implementing the general assumptions, decisions, and guidelines of the Ministerial Council relating to national defense, and coordinating the implementation of the resulting objectives.

4) Exercising, to the extent entrusted by the Ministerial Council, overall supervision of the implementation of defense objectives by agencies of government administration, state institutions, local governments, enterprises, and other bodies.

5) Exercising overall guidance on matters relating to the performance of the universal obligation of defense.

6) Overseeing the management of personnel reserves for purposes of universal obligation of defense.

7) Defining the purposes, directions, and objectives of military education.

8) Directing the affairs of the career personnel of the armed forces.

9) Directing the performance of the obligation of military service, the education of military personnel, and matters relating to meeting the social and economic needs of said personnel.

10) Directing matters relating to meeting the material, technical, and financial needs of the armed forces.

11) Directing employee affairs in the domain of national defense.

12) Implementing the decisions of the Ministerial Council concerning the participation of the Republic of Poland in the military ventures of international organizations and concerning the implementation of military obligations ensuing from international agreements.

13) Concluding international agreements ensuing from the decisions of the Ministerial Council with regard to the participation of Polish military contingents in international peace missions and humanitarian actions as well as in military exercises conducted jointly with other countries or with international organizations.

14) Establishing military missions abroad, determining their organizational structure, and directing their activities.

15) Maintaining contacts with the defense ministries of other countries and with international military organizations.

16) Overseeing the financial management of the domain of national defense.

17) Representing the State Treasury with regard to the assets owned by the organizational units in the domain of national defense, as well as exercising legally defined functions with regard to state budget assets and forms of extrabudgetary management active within the domain of national defense.

18) Overseeing the economic management of the armed forces.

19) Exercising supervision over the activities of the military gendarmerie.

20) Exercising legally defined duties with regard to military schools, military R&D units, the state enterprises for which the ministry is the parent agency, military health care facilities, agencies, and foundations.

21) Exercising the powers of overall control by the state over local agencies of military administrations and other military agencies.

22) Cooperating with other government agencies, local government bodies, and public organizations.

23) Implementing other objectives ensuing from the present law and other regulations.

Article 3.1. The minister of national defense directs the activities of the ministry and the armed forces, both directly and with the assistance of the chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army, the secretary or secretaries of state, and under secretaries of state.

3.2. The minister of national defense takes decisions on matters relating to the structure, organization, and activities of the armed forces upon consulting, or upon the recommendation of, the chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army.

3.3. In the event of absence of the minister of national defense, his duties are exercised by the secretary of state, or by a designated under secretary of state, within the scope of the powers delegated by the minister.

Article 4. The minister of national defense exercises, directly or through the mediation of a designated secretary or under secretary of state, control over:

1) Financial management.

2) Policy on career military personnel.

3) Economic and financial auditing departments.

4) Units monitoring the training and combat preparedness of the armed forces.

5) Activities of legal services.

6) International contacts.

7) Military chaplaincy.

8) Military organizational units of the procurature and courts martial.

Article 5. The minister of national defense exercises direct jurisdiction over:

1) Military information services.

2) The Academy of National Defense.

Article 6.1. The chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army commands the armed forces in peacetime on behalf of the minister of national defense.

6.2. The chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army exercises his duties with the assistance of the General Staff of the Polish Army.

Article 7.1. The chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army is directly subordinated to the minister of national defense.

7.2. The chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army is, in terms of his duties, the highest ranking soldier in active military service.

7.3. In the event of absence of the chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army, his duties are exercised by one of his deputies, designated by the chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army.

Article 8. The scope of activities of the chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army includes:

1) Participating in working out concepts of development of the armed forces and planning that development.

2) Directing the comprehensive planning of the mobilizational and strategic-operational deployment and use of the armed forces.

3) Maintaining combat preparedness and mobilizational readiness within the armed forces.

4) Directing the training of troops; defining the purposes, directions, and objectives of that training; and directing the programming and planning of combat and tactical training, as well as sports activities, within the armed forces.

5) Directing military education within the scope of powers delegated by the minister of national defense.

6) Directing material and financial programming and planning within the armed forces.

7) Exercising other duties recommended by the minister of national defense or ensuing from laws and other regulations.

Article 9.1. The minister of national defense is, with regard to persons in active military service, vested with all the disciplinary powers ensuing from the Law on Military Discipline. These powers may not be transferred by the minister of national defense to another person.

9.2. With regard to persons in active military service, including the chief of General Staff of the armed forces, the decisions of the minister of national defense have the force of a military order.

Article 10.1. The Ministerial Council shall define, by means of an executive order, the detailed scope of activities of the minister of national defense.

10.2. The Ministerial Council shall define, by means of an executive order, the statute of the Ministry of National Defense and determine the list of the organizational units subordinated to or supervised by the minister of national defense, as well as the list of state enterprises with respect to which the ministry is the parent agency.

10.3. The minister of national defense shall issue, by means of an executive order, a manual of organizational rules of the Ministry of National Defense.

Article 11. The scope of activities of the minister of national defense in wartime is defined by a separate law.

Article 12. Article 12; Article 13, Paragraph 1; and Article 14, Paragraph 1, of the Law of 21 November 1967 on the Universal Obligation of Defending the Republic of Poland (Dz.U., No. 4, Item 16, 1992; No. 40, Item 174; and No. 54, Item 254, 1992; No. 43, Item 165, 1994; and No. 7, Item 44, 1996) herewith are rescinded.

Article 13. The present law takes effect 14 days after the date of its publication.

President of the Polish Republic: A. Kwasniewski

Poland: Head of Constitutional Subcommission Dismissed

WS1906125496 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 19 Jun 96 p 4

[Report by "AN": "Dismissal From the Constitutional Commission; Kaminski No Longer Head"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday the Constitutional Commission dismissed Krzysztof Kaminski of the Confederation for an Independent Poland as head of the Editorial Subcommission. A number of opposition politicians claim that the decision was political.

Chairman Marek Mazurkiewicz of the Democratic Left Alliance accused Kaminski of frequent absences from commission sessions. Kaminski said, in self-defense, that he took part in 30 sessions of the subcommission.

Solidarity Senator Piotr Andrzejewski came to his aid, explaining that it was not Deputy Kaminski's fault that he was sick for two months. Jerzy Ciemniewski of the Freedom Union claims that Kaminski's dismissal was a political decision and violates an agreement on the appointment of heads of subcommissions.

Kaminski has been replaced by Janusz Szymanski of the Union of Labor. The position of the Editorial Subcommission head is very important now that the Constitutional Commission is completing its work. It will most probably vote on all of the provisions before the current session is over. Members of parliament decided yesterday that the draft constitution will be submitted by 92 deputies, the Senate, and the president.

Poland: Daily: President Aims To Create Security Council

WS1906134796 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 19 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by K.Gr.: "The President Is Trying To Set Up the National Security Council"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *We have found out from unofficial sources that at least several people have already received a proposal from Aleksander Kwasniewski to become members of the National Security Council [RBN]. Among the people whom the president has offered such posts are Stanislaw Ciosek, Polish ambassador to Moscow; Kazimierz Dziewanowski, former ambassador to the United States; Jan Kulakowski, Polish ambassador to the European Communities; Jerzy Lukaszewski, until recently Polish ambassador to Paris; and Janusz Reiter, former ambassador to Bonn. All of them have time to think the offer over, and they are to give the president their decisions soon.*

Kazimierz Dziewanowski will turn down the president's proposal. "It would be impossible for me to reconcile the status of an independent writer and journalist with the status of a presidential adviser," he told us.

Polish Ambassador to Moscow Stanislaw Ciosek refused to answer all questions related to the RBN. As we found out, Janusz Reiter has not responded to the president's offer yet.

Kwasniewski decided to take up the task of establishing the RBN himself after Janusz Onyszkiewicz of the Freedom Union withdrew from forming the council in the middle of last month. The council that Onyszkiewicz was trying to set up was to be represented by various political forces.

Onyszkiewicz asserted that the people he had talked with were of the opinion that the council would not be sufficiently independent and representative, and that its establishment would lead to more friction on the political scene.

The RBN that the president wants to establish is to consist of not only diplomats and experts, but also some of his ministers. The council would convene once a month and would be a presidential advisory body. Its existence is envisioned in the small constitution.

Poland: PSL Official on Coalition, Right Wing

WS1906130496 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish
18 Jun 96 p 4

[Interview with Janusz Dobrosz, deputy chairman of the PSL parliamentary club and spokesman of the party, by Joanna Malara; place and date not given: "We Are Closer to ROP Than to the SLD"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Malara] How did you manage to persuade the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] to give up the idea of holding early parliamentary elections?

[Dobrosz] It was not such a heroic thing to do. The arguments presented by the SLD were not very solid. There is no reason to call the elections in May 1997, all the more so because at this time the Eucharistic Congress will be held and the pope will be visiting our country. It is just not appropriate to disturb the visit by holding elections.

[Malara] Do you think the SLD is afraid of the papal visit?

[Dobrosz] John Paul II has made contributions to the epoch-making transformations that took place in Poland. Thus, if the pope's visit next year were to exert a positive influence on people in Poland, we should only be glad. Whatever is good for the state and the nation should also be good for SLD activists. Moral purgation is what Poland certainly needs. I do not think, however, that the pope will do any harm to the SLD. This party gained more voters by being antichurch and anticlerical. The papal visit will not have any effect on the permanent electorate of the left wing. There is a large group of people in Poland that goes to church every week and that backed Kwasniewski in the presidential elections anyway.

[Malara] Some of your activists say off the record that, after the next parliamentary elections, we may see a new coalition formed: the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [ROP], and Solidarity.

[Dobrosz] A number of new alliances are possible. Some claim that such a coalition would spell a tragedy for Poland. They term it as backward or even worse. Now, let me recall that the PSL has always been on the right side where national issues are concerned and that it has always expressed leftist views when it came to social issues.

[Malara] What do ROP and the PSL have in common today?

[Dobrosz] First, what [ROP Chairman] Olszewski is saying about agriculture is actually found in our program. ROP places great emphasis on development of cooperatives and family-owned farms. Another thing is the attitude toward foreign policy. Both we and they are in favor of integrating with NATO and the EU; we agree, however, that we should not get down on our knees. Both ROP and the PSL can see certain threats not only in the East, but also in the West, which the SLD and the Freedom Union [UW] fail to notice. We also have similar views on state interventionism and economic enfranchisement. As far as protection of our domestic market is concerned, ROP is saying the same things as the PSL. Our stands on the National Investment Funds are exactly the same.

[Malara] In a moment you will probably add that you also have similar outlooks on national and Catholic values. Why, then, does the PSL remain in the coalition with the SLD?

[Dobrosz] Are you suggesting that we are linked by the sheer desire to be in power?

[Malara] I would only like to know exactly why you have not given up the difficult work in the coalition, although you have different ideology and a different approach to the Concordat, to the economy, and to the administrative reform of the country.

[Dobrosz] There is a certain political configuration of forces in this parliament. We would be most pleased with an ally at the center of the political scene. However, at the current stage, such a possibility simply does not exist. We are also making allowances for the possibility that, in the future parliament, the configuration of forces may be far more unfavorable than it is now.

[Malara] What exactly do you mean?

[Dobrosz] The SLD may come to dominate the parliament completely. Results of opinion polls show that the popularity of the party is growing.

[Malara] What is the PSL planning to do then?

[Dobrosz] It is a sad thing that in all situations we are seen as a "young woman ready to marry." Some people think that we may forge a coalition with this or that party. However, if we took a really close look at the platforms of individual parties, we would find that even those who consider themselves uncompromising right-wing representatives are perfectly acceptable to us because they are leftist on economic and social issues. The left wing, on the other hand, is actually rightist. [passage omitted]

[Malara] You want to find yourselves in the arms of ROP so much. What about the fact that you were the United Peasant Party [ZSL] in the past? Will that not be an obstacle?

[Dobrosz] We have settled accounts with the past and we have done this better than any other party. What we did was a total cleansing. However, no one seems to understand this. One also needs to take into account the fact that, even in communist times, the ZSL's attitude toward private property differed from the approach adopted by the Polish United Workers Party. In communist times, we consecrated our banners, although things were done differently in Warsaw.

As for postcommunist times, there already were exotic alliances, such as the one between UW and the Christian-National Union, and no one was surprised to see them. No one accused them of selling themselves just to be in power.

[Malara] Are you really so sick and tired of cooperation with the SLD?

[Dobrosz] That is not the issue. I simply long for normalcy, where a change of one's coalition partner is not tantamount to betrayal. The parliament has its rights. The SLD-PSL coalition will certainly last until the elections because there is no alternative to it. If there were three or four strong groups in the Sejm, allies might change and nothing much would happen. The country would continue to live a normal life. This is why I am so amused by a statement made by Mr. Miller [SLD's head of the Office of the Council of Ministers], who is trying to scare us, saying that if the coalition breaks up, the PSL will have to give up many posts. He used to say the same things when I was a member of the Rural Youth Union. He used to come to our meetings and warn us.

[Malara] Are you holding any official talks with Jan Olszewski or Marian Krzaklewski?

[Dobrosz] Individual politicians are certainly holding meetings. However, there are no direct contacts between the PSL's statutory bodies and right-wing parties. Nonetheless, we are maintaining such contacts with Solidarity. It is a very bad thing for democracy that there is no real counterbalance to our configuration. Poland needs a center right; the German Christian Democrats would be a good model to follow.

[Malara] Which rightist group would play such a role?

[Dobrosz] That is the problem. There is no such party right now. However, it may soon crystallize.

[Malara] What do you need a serious rival for?

[Dobrosz] Poland is, unfortunately, still divided into towns and countryside. The PSL stands a slim chance of attracting voters from towns and cities. For this reason, a Christian democratic party would be our ally in towns and cities.

[Malara] Are you not afraid to cooperate closely with right-wing leaders? They are notorious for, to put it mildly, having difficult characters.

[Dobrosz] Of course, a coalition is not only the problem of a platform. There is also the problem of habits and methods used by politicians to get things done. Some are convinced, including even PSL activists, that they are the hub of the universe. This is where destruction begins. You are right in saying that formation of a new coalition will involve making difficult choices; however, we already have difficult choices to make in this coalition with the SLD. Right-wing parties are criticized for being too nervous. What is ignored is the fact that they did not have the time or the possibilities to reach certain standards. These can be reached only through work in the parliament.

[Malara] Do you think that, if they are in power, right-wing politicians will change for the better?

[Dobrosz] After all these lessons, something should really change on the right side of the political scene.

[Malara] But nothing is changing, in fact.

[Dobrosz] All the time we are hoping that something will change. The PSL is not ruling out internal changes within the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, although we still resent some of the things our coalition partner did in the past.

[Malara] How does the PSL intend to restore its image before the elections? Does the so-called problem of Pawlak persist in the party?

[Dobrosz] There was a time when the PSL was convinced that Pawlak should go. However, quite paradoxically, attacks that were launched on him actually strengthened his position in the party. All cadre issues will be decided at the PSL congress in the fall. [passage omitted]

Poland: Solidarity Denies Election Agreement With ROP

WS1906143496 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 19 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by "PAD" and M.D.Z.: "Denial From Solidarity; An Election Agreement With ROP"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 18 June Piotr Zak, spokesman of the National Commission [KK] of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity, denied suggestions made by representatives of the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [ROP] that both groups had agreed on the most fundamental points of their election agreement. Solidarity is still waiting for ROP to submit its proposals. Such an agreement might be signed at the forthcoming Solidarity congress.

Speaking about the 17 June meeting between KK Chairman Marian Krzaklewski and ROP leader Jan Olszewski, the trade union's spokesman stated that no fundamental agreements were reached regarding the formation of an electoral coalition. "The trade union is still waiting for proposals from ROP," Piotr Zak said.

In line with unofficial information, Olszewski presented Krzaklewski with several conditions that would have to be met if the agreement were to be signed, such as avoiding any cooperation with the Freedom Union [UW], rejecting the patronage of Lech Walesa, adopting a common name for the election list (Election Initiative, Solidarity-ROP), or establishing a joint club in the parliament.

According to the Solidarity spokesman, in the coming parliamentary elections, the Democratic Left Alliance can be defeated only by a wide election coalition formed by the Solidarity-ROP Election Initiative, in cooperation with Lech Walesa. "Lech Walesa would not be the leader of such a bloc; he would merely endorse it," Zak said.

Zak believes that the best time to sign an election agreement with ROP is the end of June, when Solidarity will be holding its congress.

Solidarity is not counting on the UW to join the election alliance. "This party decided some time ago that it would go its separate way."

Meanwhile, Lech Walesa reiterated on 18 June in Gdansk that, unless the right wing reaches an agreement by the end of August, he will start forming his own election bloc.

"ROP should join the Solidarity Election Initiative; however, it should do this in line with partnership principles," believe signatories of a preliminary preelection agreement with Solidarity who are part of the "United in Election" movement. Among the parties that have already ratified the declaration to form the Election Initiative, which was signed on 8 June by more than 20 groups, are: the Center Accord, the "New Poland" bloc, the National Right Wing, and the Conservative Coalition. Yesterday, leaders of the organizations grouped in the "United in Elections" movement—the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms, the Peasant-Independence Coalition [KLN], the National-Democratic Party, and the Real Politics Party—reported that they had also approved the declaration.

According to Zbigniew Wrzesinski of the KLN, ROP and the Solidarity Election Initiative should run in the elections together because what divides them is not their platforms but "psychological differences."

Poland: PSL Deputy on Agrarian Policy, Coalition

96EP0069A Krakow TYGODNIK MALOPOLSKA in Polish 9 May 96 No 19, p 5

[Interview with Bogdan Pek, PSL (Polish Peasant Party) deputy, by Piotr Walaszczyk; place and date not given: "Our Interests Are the Same"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Walaszczyk] Why has the publicity concerning the Silesian Bank affair has been so muted?

[Pek] Ask the media about it. The pretrial investigation is already over. Soon judicial proceedings will be instituted against the principal figures in that affair—Rajczyk, Chmielak, Sikora, and Kawalec. However, the man who called the shots, Minister Borowski, has evaded accountability. Given the current parliamentary alignment, he is protected from standing trial but he still can be tried by the Tribunal of State. That, however, requires the consent of the parliamentary majority and indirectly also a ruling by the Sejm Constitutional Accountability Committee. Borowski was able to allocate to Bank Slaski employees up to 10 percent of bank stock, whereas the law provides that the stock's value should not exceed 12 times the average monthly salary paid in the principal branches of the economy. In other words, that would limit the stake to 3 percent. In any normal country a man who made such a mistake, and violated the law thereby, would be politically dead.

[Walaszczyk] Why were you recalled from the post of chairman of the Sejm Privatization Committee?

[Pek] The immediate cause was a motion that the committee investigate the privatization of the Warsaw Steel Plant—the Luccini Steel Plant. At the time I had received information that the privatization was tainted. On my proposal, the Supreme Chamber of Audit investigated the matter and after a year it turned out that it is I who was right and not the deputies who had recalled me.

[Walaszczyk] How do you view the performance of Privatization Minister Kaczmarek?

[Pek] The media turned my dispute with him into a personal conflict. From the legal-formal standpoint, Minister Kaczmarek has been carrying out privatization better than did his predecessor, Minister Lewandowski. He is trying to act in accordance with the letter of the law, which does not at all mean in accordance with the electoral promises of the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance]. Even so, some of the privatization projects are in the nature of scams. This may be exemplified by the privatization of Drumet, S.A., in Wloclawek, which was sold for $7 million less than appraised. But an even bigger scandal is the issue of the contracts for managing National Investment Funds [NFI] by the management companies. These contracts conflict with the binding law; they protect the interests of these companies but not of the State Treasury. They were introduced precisely by Minister Kaczmarek, who required the supervising councils of the privatized enterprises to accept them. Something fishy is going on at NFI. Their managing companies merely sell and buy shares without carrying out restructuring and without monitoring the influx of investment capital, although these were to be the principal purposes of the Mass Privatization Program. From the beginning I have been claiming that this program harbors major risks. I believe that the next few months will show who is right. I would prefer to be wrong, because 10 percent of national wealth is owned by NFI. I fear that this program, however warranted in theory, will produce no positive consequences.

[Walaszczyk] Why is the PSL adhering to its coalition with the SLD? After all, is not the PSL closer to Solidarity or to rightist groupings?

[Pek] It is difficult to answer this question unequivocally, because Solidarity is a huge social movement and thus an umbrella for various orientations and factions whose platforms and ideas often conflict. It is not possible to conclude in parliament any other alliance that would secure the PSL's platform obligations to a greater extent than the current one with the SLD. Thus we have no room to maneuver. To be sure, the possibility of disbanding the PSL-SLD coalition exists, but any new coalition superseding it is likely to be even more liberal than the current one. If we are to attain a genuine solution of the existing problems, then we must remain within the present majority alignment in parliament. In the event of the PSL's alliance with the Freedom Union and Labor Union parties, settling upon a common economic and political platform would be even more complicated than it is at present.

[Walaszczyk] Do you perceive the possibility that the PSL and Solidarity might cooperate at lower organizational levels?

[Pek] Yes, such cooperation is even needed. This is decided by local conditions and problems. An outstanding example is the Malopolska region, where political awareness is deeper, in combination with ardent patriotism. But only the majority alignment in parliament can decide Poland's future. Yet nowadays it is not clear who is who. The parliamentary right is in reality the national-Christian left, while the left represents a liberal-supranational alignment. This also applies to Solidarity. There does not exist any trade union in the world whose attitude toward the economy is not left-leaning. Solidarity is, of course, something more than just a trade union. As a former radical activist of Solidarity I have the right to claim that the mythology of a united Solidarity-independence bloc is extremely dangerous. If we again throw everything into one sack then, after six years, we shall be back at the starting point. Unfortunately, the media divide the Polish political scene into post-Solidarity and postcommunist parts. This is a poor division. It is artificial and misleading. It confuses the public and, while achieving specific electoral purposes, it results in a lack of familiarity with facts and with the motivations and platforms of the individual groupings. For clarity of the political scene the parties should be evaluated not according to their declarations but according to their actual actions. The sole platform for honest agreement should be consensus about ideas and programs.

[Walaszczyk] Would you be ready even now to start cooperating at the regional level with local Solidarity activists?

[Pek] Such cooperation already exists. I refer here to my contacts with Messieurs Sojka and Chmielewski, the chairmen of plant committees at the Tobacco Works and Power Plant in Leg, of whom I can speak in a very complimentary manner. Such cooperation appears expedient. It so happens that the privatization of the Leg Power Plant, which is of major importance to the entire region, is an important issue.

[Walaszczyk] The PSL is believed to be a party that is principally concerned with the interests of the peasants, seemingly without regard to anything else.

[Pek] Many existing misunderstandings should be cleared up. The division of the society into two opposed groups, town and country, is artificial. Farmers complain, justly in my opinion, that they cannot attain a decent level of income. During the Balcerowicz and Bielecki administrations real income of the rural population declined by 70 percent, compared with 30 percent in the cities. And yet there can be no economic growth without the growth of agriculture and construction. The profitability of the output of most farm products is questionable. This is restraining the growth of agriculture. In the cities, on the other hand, consumers justly claim that food prices are rising. Food producers are being blamed for this situation. But there has not occurred even one instance in which a steep decline in livestock prices has resulted in lower retail prices of meat and cured meat products. This indicates that it is the middlemen, the wholesalers and retailers, who derive the greatest profits from both producers and consumers. This is additionally important considering the ongoing spread of great international trading networks to our markets. We should pursue the goal of keeping the profit margins of middlemen within the bounds of decency. Unfortunately, this cannot be resolved by legal means. Producers and consumers should set up their own wholesaling arrangements, with the participation of retailers. The conflict of interest between producers and consumers is being artificially inflated because producers are principally interested in selling their goods while consumers are concerned for buying them at the lowest price possible. At present marketing is the biggest problem of agriculture. The PSL is trying to solve it by restricting food imports and promoting exports. That is the reason why Waldemar Pawlak was attacked, chiefly by those who derived a great living from such middlemanship and imports.

[Walaszczyk] But let us return to the public's image of the PSL. Popular feeling is that the Bank of the Food Industry (BGZ, Bank Gospodarki Zywnosciowej) is an egregious example of proverbial peasant greed. The BGZ received humongous subsidies from the Treasury, and it was the taxpayers who paid for them.

[Pek] The banking system in Poland is ailing and weak. The dominant aspiration there is to privatize that sector as speedily as possible. The fallacy of such reasoning consists in that there is not enough capital in Poland for effective control of the banks. Thus there remains the foreign investor, and this is causing certain apprehensions. By determining the loan levels, the banks exert a decisive influence on investment and manufacturing processes. Moreover, privatization means selling the banks at prices much lower than actual value, in the absence of competition. The Polish banking system has, owing to Balcerowicz's "reforms," incurred soaring loan interest rates. The results were disastrous. The attendant government policy undermined agricultural services, state farms, and producer cooperatives. It is precisely the BGZ that carries the greatest burden of irrecoverable loans. Subsidies for the BGZ from the state budget in the form of government bonds have received considerable publicity, despite the fact that other commercial banks have often received even higher subsidies. Should the government withhold these subsidies, the BGZ would become bankrupt, and then much greater funds would have to be spent by the government on reimbursing private depositors. So it was more worthwhile to allocate a certain amount on rescuing Poland's largest banking network for funding agriculture than to bring about its bankruptcy. Thus, the truth lies somewhere in the middle. The purpose of the propaganda was to cut up the BGZ into slices like a salami and to take over and privatize its entire structure, which could subsequently be utilized to, e.g., create a major insurance system.

[Walaszczyk] The public has the notion that a peasant always will have enough to eat.

[Pek] This belief originates from the era of socialism when there were food shortages in cities. At the time the countryside had indeed been better off. But the optimal model is one in which town and country complement each other. It is a paradoxical situation when, following the disbanding of state farm and producer cooperatives, the government, taking the money from the taxpayer's wallet, spends greater funds on the people unemployed owing to the disbanding of these farms and cooperatives than it does on the operation of enterprises. I am not a defender of state farms and producer cooperatives, but their restructuring should be carried out at a deliberate speed and reasonably. Yet their privatization was carried out in the manner of a highway roller that flattens everything. As a result, 40 percent of people subsist at the verge of the social minimum and 25 percent below it. A way out of this situation would be a new worker-peasant alliance. Our interests are the same.

[Walaszczyk] Still, something should change in the government's farm policy, should it not?

[Pek] Of course, the government should institute a long-range, strategic policy on agriculture. That would ultimately result in improving the agrarian structure and raising productivity. It had seemed to the Liberals that this could be accomplished within a short period of time by applying the mechanisms of free-market coercion. But it was not considered that a free agricultural market simply is nonexistent anywhere in the world. Eighty percent of the budget in West Europe is allocated to farm subsidies. We must realize that, if we want to introduce reforms, then social acceptance of the spending of huge sums from the state budget on farm subsidies is needed. Then we will be able to stimulate rapid changes in agriculture. That money is needed for modernization, for creating new jobs, for developing small industry, and for loans. For the present, no such social acceptance exists. The state cannot afford it because that would lead to a fiscal disaster. Besides, small landholders who are forced by economic necessity to sell their land or give it up owing to their debts would be left jobless and without a roof over their heads. Farmers and their families receive no money from the taxpayers' wallets. They do not demand assistance. They produce food chiefly for their own needs. The elimination of a couple of hundred thousand small farms within a short period of time is a myth. The changes hinge directly on the amount of funds available from the nonfarm sector.

[Walaszczyk] Instead of the elimination of small farms, their partial specialization, at least, could be introduced, could not it?

[Pek] Such specialization does exist and is gradually developing. Compulsory specialization will not reduce production cost, and will merely introduce the risk of the bankruptcy of such farms. Let us assume that a farmer decides to specialize in strawberry growing. He receives a bank loan and plants and harvests the strawberries... and then it turns out that there is no market for them. The matter would look otherwise if the procurement and contracting systems were to be reestablished and the growth of local agricultural and food processing industry promoted at the same time. But that requires the expansion of infrastructure. All this is being done, but slowly, because the state is poor. I support uniform development, equal chances for town and country, because only such a policy will not upset the social equilibrium. In this sense, the PSL represents the economic interests of province dwellers. As for principles, hardly anyone can doubt that in parliament we represent the only significant political option defending Polish national interests.

[Walaszczyk] The problem is not just economic but probably also that of social and provincial mentality.

[Pek] Changes in economic and political mentality occur much more slowly than economic processes. Why is it, for example, that discharged clerical employees do not establish their own businesses? That is so not just because of their own lack of initiative but also because of the dearth of low-cost credit. That is something that only government policies can correct. The government may bring it about that the resources earned by the most profitable subsectors of the state economy would be, upon social acceptance and acceptance by parliament, allocated for restructuring industry, promoting small industry, creating new jobs, and developing a network of small service establishments in town and country. What is the alternative? Borrowing substantial foreign credit and thus "drowning" the sovereignty of the Polish state? After all, to this day, one-third of the state budget is earmarked for repaying the foreign debt contracted by the communists.

[Walaszczyk] Has the Oleksy affair affected the PSL-SLD alliance?

[Pek] Well, I know of at least several gentlemen in the Sejm who could have been prime ministers without having cordial ties to foreign intelligence services. I do not know whether Oleksy's forced resignation was intended to terminate the influence of a foreign intelligence service on the Polish Government or whether it served to remove from power individuals who represented the pro-Eastern policy in favor of those representing the pro-Western orientation. As a Polish citizen I am interested in knowing whether the democratically elected authorities are independent and sovereign. There are many unknowns about the Oleksy affair. It is likely that the principal details will never reach the public. The question of independence of the procurature remains open. In my opinion, it should be an autonomous institution and the procurator general should be appointed to a term of office. Political pressures on the procurature during the present and previous terms have been and remain decisive to quashing many cases and to the weakness of the procurature. In economic matters the biggest problem is the shortage of experts. Those that exist are mostly of the same "hue," usually liberal, and prepare expertises that are not consonant with truth. Still, in the times of Minister Lewandowski it used to be even worse.

Poland: Achievements, Future of Privatization Viewed

WS2006100096 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 17 Jun 96 p 9

[Article by Ada Kostrz-Kostecka: "Privatization: Results and Prospects for 1996; Public Offers Lagging Behind"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The statistics of the first months of capital privatization do not look very optimistic. Through the end of April the Ministry of Privatization [MPW] sold only seven companies (including five in the first quarter of the year); however, there are no grounds yet for generalizations. Last year, a few transactions were concluded at the end of the year; as a result, the planned revenues were considerably exceeded. Still, the total amount of privatized companies—26—turned out to be rather small and came closer to the 1992 results (24 privatized companies). In 1994, 35 companies were sold; in 1993, 48 companies.*

Nevertheless, achieving the target of 90 companies undergoing capital privatization, as stated in the "Directions of Privatization in 1996," seems hardly likely in spite of the launch of a hitherto defunct means of privatization—bidding—unless this particular method gains great popularity. However, Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek announced that this year the Ministry will not prepare five to seven public offers for companies. Instead, there will be public bidding for companies from the National Investment Funds [NFI] program. Because two of the funds (the E. Kwiatkowski NFI and NFI XV) are to submit to the Securities Committee [KPW] the prospectuses of three companies by the end of June, their shares are likely to be offered for sale this fall. It is not certain whether other funds will have their public offers ready by the end of the year. According to the declarations of fund representatives and managing firms, in the second half of the year the Committee will be given at least five prospectuses of companies from the fund.

If the MPW falls short of the "Directions of Privatization" provisions concerning the number of companies privatized by the capital method, it is still likely to submit 1.8 bln zlotys to the budget, as stated in the Budget Act. Many of the privatization projects pursued at present by the Ministry concern great enterprises (for example, Ruch, Orbis, Hutmen, the Leg power station, Janikosoda and Soda Matwy); the stock sale yield will therefore be considerable. Ownership transformation in these companies is taking quite a lot of time, so it is hard to estimate how many of the projects will be concluded this year.

MPW statistics show that a very small number of firms were commercialized this year (82 in four months). Last year, 235 enterprises were commercialized; in 1994, 196; in 1993, 47; and in 1992, 220.

The statistics are much better in the other spheres of ownership transformation. Within four months, the privatization of 38 enterprises was started in accordance with Article 37 of the Privatization Act. On a yearly scale, this would mean direct privatization at the same level as last year (107 firms). Statistics reveal that this form of ownership transformation is evidently losing popularity: in 1994, 125 such privatizations were started; in 1993, 198; in 1992, 270; and in 1990 and 1991, 449 (the data for these two years have been combined because privatization began in mid-1990, after the Privatization Act had come into force). In contrast, this year more companies were privatized (53) as compared with last year (109). In 1994, 238 such privatizations were completed; in 1993, 232, and in 1992, 293.

Romania: No Serious Progress in Treaty Talks With Hungary

AU2006085596 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1925 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A new round of Romanian-Hungarian talks on the documents of the reconciliation with Hungary, as well as the basic political treaty between the two countries was held in Bucharest yesterday and today.

This evening, Doina Saiciuc, our correspondent accredited at the Romanian Foreign Affairs Ministry, interviewed Foreign Ministry spokesman Sorin Ducaru on this issue.

[Saiciuc] Mr. Ducaru, the round of negotiations between the experts that began yesterday and concluded today in Bucharest was agreed upon by the two foreign ministers, Theodor Melescanu and Laszlo Kovacs, in Salzburg in May, on the occasion of the European Forum there. What were the expectations of the Romanian delegation of experts, and what were the results of this latest round of talks?

[Ducaru] That is right. The two foreign ministers, who attended the Salzburg conference, agreed to continue the talks on the Romanian-Hungarian treaty and the reconciliation documents. The Romanian and Hungarian Foreign Ministries therefore kept in touch and established that the talks should be held this week. As a matter of fact, it was planned to hold the treaty talks in Bucharest, while the talks on the reconciliation, partnership, and code of conduct were supposed to be held in Budapest. In the end, however, we agreed to hold all of the talks in Bucharest. The agenda was ambitious, indeed, if I may say so, considering the large number of documents.

Well, some progress was achieved in examining and drawing up certain provisions of the reconciliation and partnership accord, as well as the code of conduct for the ethnic minorities. The negotiations on the basic treaty, however, ended without significant progress. That is because the two parties' positions are still quite far apart on Recommendation 1201 of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly and on the way this document should be mentioned or referred to in the treaty text.

Anyway, some of the Romanian side's proposals are being examined by the Hungarian side, and we look forward to seeing how they evaluate them.

[Saiciuc] Have any new elements appeared?

[Ducaru] The whole idea behind these Bucharest talks was to see how far we could go while following the general lines and proposals that have been made so far—that is, on the same basis on which the talks have been held so far, within the boundaries of the two parties' mandates. The point was to see whether we could reach a point of convergence or compromise by examining every juridical and diplomatic formulation to the last letter.

If no compromise can be reached by means of careful wording of the text, we will proceed to discuss entirely new formulations.

So, as I said, they are to examine some of the proposals, nuances suggested by the Romanian side, and we are waiting to see whether they can serve as a basis for the convergence of our positions.

[Saiciuc] Do you believe there is enough time left for the Romanian-Hungarian basic political treaty to be concluded before the end of this year?

[Ducaru] Of course, the Romanian party is absolutely ready to do so, and it is our, the diplomats,' duty to do our utmost so that the negotiations on the treaty can be concluded as soon as possible and that we can work out a text that suits both parties and is also acceptable to the parliaments of our two countries. I would like to reassert our complete readiness and the commitment of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to find a compromise formula.

Slovenia: WEU Associate Membership Anticipated 'This Month'

AU2006110796 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 19 Jun 96 p 1

[Report by S.Z.: "Will Slovenia Be Admitted Into the WEU This Month Already?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Brussels, 18 June—Slovenia will probably become an associate Western European Union [WEU] member this month already, which the signing of the associate EU membership agreement facilitates. The expanded WEU council session at the level of the ambassadors of 27 countries at today's session supported our application for associate membership. Slovenia has striven for membership for a long time, but the WEU concluded that we should sign the EU associate membership first. [passage omitted]

Slovenia: Data Show Higher Inflation, Lower Wages

AU1806141396 Ljubljana SLOVENEC in Slovene 1 Jun 96 p 5

[Article by Vida Kocjan: "Inflation Is Rising, the Government Is Taking a Nap"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana—The announcement of May data on the level of inflation brought an end to the uncertainty and the doubts regarding this year's wrongly set economic goals. The inflation level in May is 0.7 percent, and, considering inflation in the first five months of the year, this already means a 5.1-percent increase in retail prices this year. If the prices keep rising until the end of the year as they have been rising in the last five months, then we will have a minimum of 13 to 14 percent inflation at the end of the year. This means that the level of planned yearly inflation of 6 to 7 percent is not attainable, and it will be impossible to repeat last year's achievement, when the yearly inflation was 8.5 percent. On the basis of these data and the data on the constant decrease in the physical extent of production (it has been decreasing since last August, with a few brief pauses), a special department of the Ministry for Economic Relations and Development has prepared an analysis for the month of May; the department will present it next week. "The analysis is also supposed to give answers as to which macroeconomic goals need to be adjusted and put together in a different way than they are noted in the budget memorandum. The analysis will also show what goals need to be set, so that these will also be attainable," said Janko Dezelak, minister for economic relations and development and the deputy prime minister of the government, at the latest news conference on Tuesday morning [28 May].

According to Dezelak, the reasons for the higher inflation lie in higher-than-planned wages, the increased value of the rate of the tolar in the past months, and inconvenient economic developments among the main foreign trade partners.

Those experts who are familiar with conditions over the years were surprised by the data on May inflation, since this is the month in which the prices of seasonal products decrease considerably. We have not had any other high price increases, and the government has especially shown mercy regarding the price increases of gasoline and other crude oil derivatives, telephone services, liquid natural gas, and suchlike. In short, for now, the government has limited the increase in prices of products that it controls. Of course, the price increases of the mentioned products or services are hanging above the government's and our heads like a Sword of Damocles, and it is only a question of time before the government will give in. If the government approves only a 10-percent increase in the price of oil derivatives (those in the oil industry are demanding a greater increase), then the government will automatically increase inflation by 1 percent and will cause a chain reaction that will increase the prices of transportation and other services. At one of the last news conferences, Economics Minister Metod Dragonja said that the government will not agree to higher price increases, and that it will thoroughly check up on all the cost calculations of the companies. He agreed with the statement that the purchase price for crude oil are increasing on the world markets, and that the value of the dollar is increasing, but that the situation was also the opposite at one time: "In the golden age, when the oil companies had 'gathered up' large profits, they did not demand that the government lower the prices, and that is why they can also be a bit more patient now." "The same rules must be valid at all times, if we want to keep the macroeconomic goals that we had set for ourselves," added the minister. There is no doubt that the minister is right in many matters, since the largest oil company, Petrol, was in second place regarding the profits that it made last year.

Regardless of this, our country will quite soon find itself facing a large financial breakdown, since the eventual signing of the associative agreement with the European Union will mean approximately 24 billion tolars less in the state treasury in the coming year due to the lowering of some customs duties. Apart from this, and the introduction of some new burdens on the state budget (for example the full children's supplement and the repayment of loans), the government will have to decide on a higher value-added tax (and thus higher final prices), and the oil derivatives are exactly the opportunity for the government to put considerably more into the state treasury than in this year.

All the Indicators Are Pointing Downwards

The latest published data on the indicators of management show a really unbelievable picture. Industrial production is down 5.1 percent. Of this, the production of equipment is down 6.5 percent, and the production of nonfinished products [reprodukcijski materijal] is down 6.1 percent. The common indicator is "improved" only by the extent of the goods produced for wide consumption, which even increased by 0.2 percent. We do not have all the data on the trade exchange with foreign countries since the state department for statistics will only publish temporary data until the end of summer. But even the available data show that exports decreased by 6.8 percent, and imports by 4.5 percent.

The data on the number of the employed are especially critical. According to the latest data, 585,961 people are employed. Of these, 437,631 work in the economy, and 148,330 work in the noneconomy [negospodarstvo]. There are 120,780 unemployed, but this figure is very deceptive, since official data only "count" those unemployed people who are registered at the state department for the unemployed, which means that they fulfill all the (strict) legal requirements for their registration. Last month alone approximately 3,000 people were removed from the records. All the other unemployed, the number of whom no one else in the country obviously wants to know, are not recorded anywhere. That is why reports of a 14-percent unemployment rate, although it is amongst the highest in Europe, are deceptive and very incorrect. Moreover, we are "playing host" to 40,000 foreigners, and many of them have work permits.

The average net old age pension amounts to 57,871 tolars, and 456,594 citizens are retirees.

Of the 105,000 registered companies, only 33,609 are active in business, of which 31,939 are small businesses. In these small companies, there are usually either no employees or just one or two.

The average net wage per employee is 76,552 tolars, which means 120,206 tolars gross. The average salary in the economy is 112,208 tolars, and in the noneconomy it is 143,612 tolars. Gross salaries have really increased by 1.7 percent, but the last payments show that the wages have really been decreasing slowly from month to month.

Federal

FRY: Impact of Changes to Election Law Assessed

AU2006110496 Belgrade BETA in English
13-20 Jun 96

[BETA commentary: "A New Election Law Adopted: The Socialists Are Securing Their Victory"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text]

Serbia Now Has 29 Voting Districts, Montenegro Has Seven

The ruling parties of Serbia and Montenegro—the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS)—have succeeded on June 18 in pushing through the Federal Parliament changes in the Election Law by which the number of voting districts from which the MP's [members of parliament] of the Chamber of Citizens are elected was increased. Thus, instead of nine voting districts, Serbia now has 29, while Montenegro has seven instead of one.

The number of voting districts was increased at the time when the federal elections in Yugoslavia have already been scheduled for the end of the year. By changing the Election Law in such way, the government has, in fact, raised the election census, which means that the smaller parties, primarily the opposition parties, will be incapable of winning seats in the Parliament. The opposition has determined that the election census will now be 15-20 percent, depending on the voting district.

A long time ago the ruling parties have started preparations for the change of the Election Law by entering a campaign of establishing their branches in the cities throughout Serbia and Montenegro. The opposition lacks the strength and the money for similar actions, and thus will not be present in all voting districts.

Though in its official explanation the Federal Government stated that the increase in the number of voting districts was aimed at "establishing better contact between the voters and the candidates," the opposition announced that in this way the two ruling parties in Serbia and Montenegro will secure a stable majority in the Federal Parliament which, with the previous rules, they could not have hoped to achieve.

The changes of the Election Law in the Federal Parliament were made through simple majority, in which the ruling parties were aided by the voters of several smaller satellite parties. The federal minister of justice, Uros Klikovac, called the new law a "technicality," rejecting the objections of the opposition and the independent analysts, who warned that through it, the electoral system was, in fact, being changed, from the proportional to the majority system, and that a two third majority was needed for such a move.

At the present, the two ruling parties do not have a two third majority in the Federal Parliament. The Serbian Radical Party announced its appeal to the Constitutional Court, but chances for the appeal to be accepted are slim. The Federal Government, consisting of the representatives of the two parties, has used the opportunity to achieve changes by proposing the "Law on Voting Districts" instead of the Election Law. The Yugoslav Constitution stipulates that the Law on the Election of Deputies to the Chamber of Citizens is to be adopted by a two third majority.

The Federal Parliament consists of two Chambers: The Chamber of Citizens (138 MP's) and the Chamber of Republics, in which the two Yugoslav republics have 20 deputies each.

Despite predictions that the Montenegrin socialist will oppose the Law, they voted for it without any objections. The ruling Montenegrin party probably counts that by having "broken up" the republic into a number of voting districts it would, in fact weaken its opposition—the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (LAM) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP)—and take over a part of their votes. It is estimated that in the previous elections, the Montenegrin Muslims voted for the opposition, as their Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the sister party of the Bosnian Muslims, had boycotted the elections.

However, the SDA has announced its participation in the forthcoming elections; but owing to the number of voting districts and their distribution, that is to the fact that the election census has been raised, the SDA will probably achieve little. The DPS, thus, expects to, on one side, take over the SDA's votes, while on the other, weaken its rivals—the liberals and the social democrats.

During their current mandate and lacking the absolute majority, the SPS and the DPS had to search for coalition partners. At first they were helped by the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) of Vojislav Seselj, but after their row with him, they found a much needed ally with the faction of the SRS—that is, with a group of its MP's who "seceded" from the radicals and established a deputy club of their own under the name of the Serbian Radical Party Nikola Pasic.

When the Federal Government announced the coming changes in the Election Law aimed to suit the needs of the ruling parties, the SRS Nikola Pasic MP's refused to uphold its proposal, having realized that, if adopted, the new law would prevent them from remaining in the Parliament. This was the reason why the session of the

Federal Parliament's Chamber of Citizens scheduled for May 31, had to be postponed for June 18.

Well-informed sources claim that the radical MP's were firm in their decision to sell their seats dearly. Obviously, they have obtained something in exchange of their support of the new Election Law, as on June 18, at the Federal Parliament's session, they voted for it.

The Parliament's Upper Chamber (the Chamber of Republics) has adopted the new law at its session of May 31. When the Federal Government came forward with its proposal, the opposition strongly reacted. The increase in the number of voting districts was seen by it as transformation of the existing proportional electoral system into a majority system, and through it, the elimination of smaller parties. The opposition also warned that the Election Law can be changed by a two third majority in the Parliament, which the ruling SPS and DPS do not have.

The opposition also warned that by making moves aimed at improving their position, the ruling parties are in fact additionally polarizing political forces in the country, and described such moves as "risky and dangerous." The response of all opposition parties was almost unanimous; however, not one among them, except maybe the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), has intimated its intention to boycott such elections.

Representatives of the ethnic minorities' parties hold that the new Election Law will primarily damage their interests. The Democratic Alliance of the Vojvodina Hungarians (DZVH) warned that the changes in the Election Law "are a setback to the relations of the majority nation and ethnic minorities," because 350,000 Hungarians will have only one MP in the Federal Parliament.

It is quite possible that simultaneously with the federal elections, the republican elections in Montenegro will be held. The ruling DPS announced that, for the occasion, Montenegro will be divided in 14 voting districts.

Regarding the proposal, Montenegrin President, Momir Bulatovic, met with the representatives of the Montenegrin opposition parties—the Popular Party (NS) [People's Party], the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (LAM) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). The meeting was preceded by a letter of protest, sent by the opposition to the President, in which they had expressed their dissatisfaction over the proposed increase in the number of voting districts.

The meeting was held behind closed doors; according to Beta's sources, however, Bulatovic flatly told the opposition representatives that it is the DPS's intention to, in this way, improve its position. Bulatovic also added that in doing so, both ruling parties have foreign support and that the opposition "should not even try to do something about it."

So far, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic has not yet announced his intention to talk with the representatives of the Serbian opposition regarding the issue of the electoral system.

Serbia

Serbia: GSS Sees No Official Action on Kosovo Before Vote

AU1906171296 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1147 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 19 June (BETA)—Vesna Pesic, chairwoman of the Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS), has assessed today that the authorities will not take any action to resolve the Kosovo problem before the elections.

"As for the Kosovo issue, the authorities distinguish between 'patriotic' parties and 'treacherous' ones, but they are not taking any action to resolve the situation, although recent events in Kosovo are increasing the tension," Pesic said at a news conference.

She has assessed that "despite exaggeration" and "clamorous statements," nothing is being done to resolve the question of Kosovo and that there is no necessary dialogue between Belgrade and the Kosovar Albanians.

Serbia: DSS Criticizes Milosevic's Policy in Kosovo

AU1906173096 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1147 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 19 June (BETA)—Milorad Jovanovic, spokesman for the Democratic Party of Serbia [DSS], has today accused the authorities in Serbia of doing nothing to resolve the situation in Kosovo and of pursuing an "ostrich-like policy" in that part of Serbia.

"How many more police officers have to be killed (in Kosovo) to move Slobodan Milosevic to get down to settling the problem of Kosovo?" Jovanovic asked at a news conference.

He said that, since 1989 when he abolished the quasi-federal status of Kosovo, Milosevic has done nothing, which has resulted in the creation of a parallel ethnic Albanian state that has been "functioning quite well" over the past five years.

"By keeping a large police force in Kosovo, Milosevic has not increased security but has rather provided an alibi for ethnic Albanian terrorism," Jovanovic assessed.

He said that the passive attitude of the authorities toward Kosovo had made possible the internationalization of the Kosovo problem instead of having everything resolved here, between Belgrade and Pristina.

"Perhaps some new Wright Patterson Base (Dayton) will eventually force Serbia to resolve the Kosovo issue, which will certainly not be favorable for Serbia," Jovanovic concluded.

Serbia: Opposition Claims New Election Law 'Irregular'

LD1906194796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1908 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 19 (TANJUG)—Serbian opposition parties on Wednesday said the new law on election units in Yugoslavia and its federal units of Serbia and Montenegro, adopted in the parliament's lower house, had been irregular.

The DEPOS-SPO [Serbian Democratic Alliance-Serbian Renaissance Movement] deputy club in the Chamber of Citizens of the Federal Assembly said the implementation of this law would have 'harmful effects on citizens and push the country away from Europe and the world.'

These regulations will very soon be reconsidered, but with the participation of all elected peoples' representatives and in public, said the statement which was signed by club head Milan Komnenic.

Most opposition parties boycott the work of the federal and Serbian assemblies because there is no direct TV coverage of their sessions.

Democratic Party of Serbia spokesman Milorad Jovanovic said the new law on election units would cause a 'further polarization and social instability' because the authorities were pushing parties to fight for their interests using extra-parliamentary means.

The spokesman of this party, which has MPs only in the Serbian Assembly, said the new law and the 'process of stifling the media' had made 'a legal and political framework for new irregular elections.'

Serbian Civil Alliance president Vesna Pesic said 'confrontation between the authorities and the opposition is growing unnecessarily' and said she believed that was a consequence of the new the law on election units.

Pesic, whose party also has MPs only the Serbian Assembly, said all opposition parties should unite and join forces to work on forming equal conditions for all parties during the election campaign, which she said implied a deblockade of the media.

Serbia: Majority in Vojvodina Reportedly Favor Autonomy

AU1806150296 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 17 Jun 96

[Report by M. Kalinic: "The Majority of Vojvodina Citizens Support Full Autonomy"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Stara Pazova—[Passage omitted] According to scientific research, over 60 percent of Vojvodina citizens support the idea of full autonomy within a democratic Serbia and Yugoslavia. Thereby the question of Vojvodina's autonomy has been legitimized, according to local circles. GLASNIK has been making efforts over the past three years to make clear to the public that "Vojvodina's inclination toward autonomy is governed by objective permanent geographical, historical, economic, ethnic, cultural, and civilization characteristics of this region, rather than by the will of this or that political force."

That is, members of the Vojvodina club [clanovi Vojvodjanski klub—not further specified] are convinced that this is in the genuine interest of all Vojvodina citizens, regardless of their national, religious, professional, or party affiliations, and regardless of whether they were born here or moved here with the intention of staying in Vojvodina for good. [passage omitted]

Montenegro

Montenegro: Opposition Demands PM Explain U.S. Visit

AU1906163096 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 15-16 Jun 96 p 4

[Article by D.V.: "Did Djukanovic Financially Help Clinton's Election Campaign?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica—The president of the People's Party of Montenegro, Novak Kilibarda, yesterday appealed to the prime minister of Montenegro, Milo Djukanovic, to publicly say "what the motives were for his attendance at the donors' cocktail lunch organized by the Democratic Party of the United States," all the more since the public of Montenegro did not know anything about Djukanovic's visit to the United States nor about his motives for it at all.

"The fact that the prime minister of Montenegro goes to the United States nearly incognito indicates that it was either his private visit to the Democratic Party of the United States, or a personal business trip by the future Montenegrin businessman, as Milo Djukanovic several times called himself," Kilibarda says, and demands Prime Minister Djukanovic explain his visit to the

United States in the parliament of Montenegro as soon as possible. Otherwise, the People's Party of Montenegro will initiate a parliamentary debate on the foreign policy of the government of Montenegro.

In his public statement, the leader of the People's Party of Montenegro asked in what capacity Prime Minister Djukanovic took part in the cocktail party "which the Democratic Party of the United States organized for the purpose of collecting monetary donations," and expressed an assumption that Djukanovic had maybe financially helped the presidential campaign of Bill Clinton. "Specifically, attendance at the donors' cocktail parties organized by the presidential candidates in the United States is only possible for persons who have given financial support to that candidate," Kilibarda stated.

Kosovo

Kosovo: 8 Ethnic Albanians Indicted on Ethnic Hatred Charge

AU2006081296 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1632 GMT 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina, 18 Jun (BETA)—The Pristina district court has begun an investigation of eight Kosovo Albanians who stand accused of perpetrating the criminal acts of instigating national, religious, and ethnic hatred, division or intolerance on 19 and 20 March 1990.

The indictment states that the accused, among whom are Blerim Shala and Halil Matoshi, editors of the Albanian language weekly ZERI, "acted systematically in a group and with the help of propaganda to instigate hatred and ethnic division among the peoples and ethnic groups living in Kosovo, resulting in an outbreak of riots and violence against members of the Serbian and Montenegrin peoples."

According to the indictment, biology teacher Jaha Agron purported that the Djuro Djakovic secondary school was poisoning students with chemicals, although a medical check in the Pristina hospital determined that the six pupils involved were not poisoned.

The accused Blerim Shala and Matoshi subsequently spread these reports via Radio Pristina and at numerous news conferences, thereby sparking a mass movement by Albanian students at the Djuro Djakovic and 8 November schools not to attend classes, the indictment says.

It is stated that in the period between 22 and 24 March 1990 in Podujevo and other towns in Kosovo, citizens of Albanian ethnicity turned en masse on the medical centers and accused citizens of the Serbian and the Montenegrin ethnicity of poisoning, which resulted in attacks on 75 Serbs and Montenegrins, six of whom sustained grievous and 14 light bodily injuries.

The Kosovo committee for the protection of human rights and liberties deemed this "yet another political process" and warned that "this could activate a new wave of politically motivated court cases against the Albanians."

Kosovo: Serbs Blame 'Albanian Terrorists' for Shootings

AU2006121096 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 19 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The local Kosova organization of Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) accused Tuesday what it calls "Albanian terrorists" for the shooting incidents on Sunday [16 June] and Monday in Podujeve [Podujevo] and Mitrovice [Mitrovica], in which one Serb policeman was killed and two others wounded.

The Kosova SPS organization referred to the latest shooting incidents as "terrorist attacks of Albanian separatists" in Podujeve and Shipol of Mitrovice, calling the attacks "an attempt to undermine all the efforts the progressive forces are being making to establish a permanent peace in Kosova and Metohija."

The Prishtina branch of the SPS said "the Albanian terrorists have not given up terrorism as a means to realize their goals." In addition, the Youth League of Kosova, a Serb regime organization, blamed "Albanian terrorists" for the attacks, adding "it is clear they (terrorists) have the support, probably the assistance, of Albanian political parties of separatist orientation in Kosova and Metohija."

The Serbian regime's practice of routinely laying the blame on "Albanian terrorists," while producing or referring to no evidence, has become a hallmark of the way Serbia operates in Kosova.

The fact that the Serbian authorities have failed in the past few years to bring to trial a single Albanian who has been engaged in an act of terrorism has not made the SPS, the ruling party in Serbia, to think twice before hastily accusing "Albanian terrorists" whenever a shooting incident occurred in Kosova, in which Serb policemen were casualties.

Milosevic's Serbia has, however, tried hundreds of Kosova Albanians, branding many of them "terrorists," although their only "offense" has been their involvement in political activities which opposed Serbian rule in Kosova.

While the Kosova leadership has advocated a policy of non-violent resistance to the Serbian rule, which has been pursued by the Albanians with an unprecedented discipline and forbearance, Serbia has cracked down on Kosova with military and police might.

While the Kosova leadership has continuously affirmed its commitment to peaceful means and condemned all terrorists acts in the strongest terms, the Serbian troops have killed peaceful Albanians and the Serbian regime branded Albanian political activists "terrorists."

Kosovo: Serbs Reportedly Provoking Albanians in Podujevo

*AU2006092996 Tirana ATA in English
1932 GMT 19 Jun 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 19 (ATA)—The Information Centre of Kosova [QIK] points out that the new wave of state violence and terror in Kosova proves of possibilities for efforts to cause great troubles at a time when the question of Kosova has become prominent for the international community.

Two days ago, a group of 20 Serbian civilians physically attacked three Albanian pupils near the primary school Faik Konica in Prishtina, the QIK reports.

One of the pupils in the fourth grade had bodily injures.

Reports from Podujeve [Podujevo] say that a grave situation is prevailing there after an incident the previous night during which a policeman was wounded.

So far 30 people have been beaten and tortured on the street and in a police station.

Serbian forces were present in great numbers during the night before last. While last night Serbian policemen in plain clothes entered in bars in Podujeve intimidating and provoking Albanians in there.

LDK [Democratic League of Kosova] branch in Podujeve considers the present repressive situation identical with some previous campaigns after unmotivated incidents by Serbian police.

None of the reported incidents in the last years including some incidents in April this year, have yet been clarified.

The leadership of Kosova has continuously repeated and attracted the attention that the policy of continuous terror against the Albanians is creating for years now a tense climate and a permanent threat.

The peaceful orientation of the Albanian political movement and the avoidance so far of the armed conflict in Kosova are without doubt among the main results and values of the peaceful policy in Kosova.

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